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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the public-sector's business
strategy in the public-private partnership formed to develop
the proposed 23-acre, $1.5-billion Yerba Buena Gardens (YBG)
project in downtown San Francisco. Formalized in 1984, the
partnership aims to use the development value of this land,
which the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA) owns, to
fund public amenities including magnificent gardens and
cultural facilities.
In partnership with the private master developer, Yerba
Buena Gardens Associates (YBGA), the SFRA would share risk
for the life of the project. Therefore, as a response to the
project's historical legacy and financial scale, the public
sector officials crafted a strategy that would provide a
framework to define and control how project risks were
shared. Two elements were key: (1).aligning the interests
of each party and, (2) ensuring the necessary flow of funds
to construct and operate the public facilities.
This thesis analyzes the partnership agreement
throughout the evolution of the project to gain an
understanding of how the strategy developed and survived as
the project was racked by programmatic, economic, and
political change. The negotiating posture and actions of the
SFRA are interpreted as evidence of the Agency's
entrepreneurial behavior in actively sharing risk with its
private development partner. Finally, the strategy is
evaluated as a risk management tool for the SFRA and as a
model for public risk-sharing more generally.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Associate Professor, Department of Urban Studies
and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
In downtown San Francisco on October 17, 1989, a grand-
opening party was taking place on the top floor of the new
Marriott Hotel. After more than 30 years of controversy, the
opening of the Marriott symbolized the first tangible
accomplishment of the City's $1.5-billion, 23-acre public-
private joint venture, Yerba Buena Gardens (YBG). As
developers, public officials, and interested citizens
joyously celebrated the realization of the first phase of the
city's most ambitious redevelopment project, a devastating
earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale shook northern
California, adding one more jolt to a development agenda
already bedeviled by a shaky history.
The Marriott hotel and all the construction activity on
nearby blocks represent a milestone in the City's
redevelopment of downtown. Named "Yerba Buena" after the
first San Francisco settlement, YBG is a city initiative
orchestrated by the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA)
in concert with its private-sector partner, Olympia & York
(O&Y), a Toronto-based concern and one of the world's largest
real estate development companies.
The project is interesting to study for several reasons.
First, it is arguably one of the largest and most complex
redevelopment plans in the U.S. today. Second, the City's
strategy -- which aims to create a public-amenities package
dependent on mixed-use private development for both
construction and operations funding -- is different from most
public-private partnership projects taken on by city
redevelopment agencies. For instance, development of
downtown festival marketplaces creates a single public-
oriented use, with adjacent complimentary uses springing up
through subsequent private development initiatives. In
contrast, the plan for YBG is an enormous mixed-use project
including hotel, office, retail, residential, cultural,
recreation, and entertainment uses all being developed -- in
scheduled sequence -- by the Agency in partnership with a
single master developer.
Third, the existing underground City-run Moscone
Convention Center, located within the project boundaries, is
being expanded beneath the planned public gardens and
recreation areas. In addition, the new home of the San
Francisco Museum of Modern Art (SFMOMA), to be constructed
and financed by a museum-related entity, is also within the
YBG boundary. Although developed independently of the
partnership, these uses have become symbolic of the entire
project: they represent both the economic revival and
cultural policy objectives that have propelled the city
initiative for so many years. They also promise to create a
critical mass of attractions likely to insure the ultimate
success of the project.
Fourth, the SFRA is actively playing the role of an
entrepreneurial deal-maker in San Francisco's distinctly
restrictive development climate. Improvements planned for
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construction in the YBG area are not subject to the city's
standard design review process; they may exceed the city's
zoning height restrictions; and they are not generally
subject to the Proposition M growth restraint which limits
annual office space construction to 475,000 square feet per
year. In addition, while there is a citizen review process
for the makeup of the public-amenity package and program, the
SFRA retains control over the final decisions. Thus, the
SFRA's business negotiations and policy decisions will have a
profound impact on both the physical and programmatic
integrity of the downtown area.
Finally, the drawn-out history and extended negotiation
processes involving several levels of City government,
diverse citizen coalition groups, and business organizations,
have created substantial pressure on the SFRA to produce the
sought-after public amenities. There is so much pressure, in
fact, that the SFRA is plowing ahead with its plan to
construct the public amenities, despite soft market
conditions that are causing O&Y to delay purchase of the land
and construction of the private improvements. Since the
SFRA's goal is to fund the construction of the public
amenities with proceeds from the sale of land on which the
private improvements will be constructed, this becomes a true
test of the SFRA's initial business strategy which was first
formalized in the 1984 Disposition and Development Agreement
(DDA) and subsequent amendments with the private developer.
A detailed study of this unique and complex public-
private partnership should reveal a process by which a public
agency translates its public policy objectives into sound
business terms for risk-sharing. An analysis of the Agency's
behavior, throughout the protracted life of the project, will
shed some light on what it means for a public deal-maker to
take on risk.
Plans, Icons, and Images
Yerba Buena Center (YBC) is an ambitious 87.3-acre
mixed-use redevelopment site, located in the South of Market
(SOMA) district directly adjacent to the office and retail
districts of downtown San Francisco (See Exhibit 0.1). YBG
is a 23-acre portion of the YBC area consisting of the three
"Central Blocks" (CB-1, CB-2, and CB-3) bounded by Market,
Folsom, Third, and Fourth Streets, and one adjacent "East
Block" (EB-2) bounded by Third, Second, Mission and Howard
Streets (See Exhibits 0.2 and 0.3).
The distinctive 40-story Marriott tower, set slightly
away from the heart of downtown, is now one of the more
noticeable elements in San Francisco's beautiful skyline. It
is less than affectionately known by residents and visitors
alike as the "jukebox," for its distinctive ornamental black
glass windows in the shape of a jukebox located in a random
pattern near the top of the pink concrete box-like structure.
Its hulking shape rises above the neighborhood like a
misplaced mountain.
The hotel is located on Market Street, near the corner
of Fourth Street and occupies approximately 25% of one block
of the four-block YBG redevelopment area. Behind the hotel
to the south is a huge construction site. On the adjacent
block, thick concrete and steel beams form a roof for
Marriott's underground meeting rooms and a base for proposed
above-grade development. On the south end of the adjacent
block, steel columns and beams jut out of the ground across
the street from the above-grade entrance to the underground
Moscone Convention Center. Construction trailers and cars
sit behind the Convention Center entrance on a fenced gravel
parking area. Razed land and free-standing buildings that
were once part of a city block are visible on the blocks to
the east. Around the site are newly constructed residential,
retail, and office buildings awaiting completion of the
project.
Though the site is pretty bleak today, the SFRA
envisions an active, vibrant urban park teeming with San
Francisco residents, workers, tourists and other visitors.
It imagines the YBG project as a symbol of the cultural
diversity of the city, a high quality urban mecca that will
have its own distinct sense of place. It hopes the place
will become a destination for the diverse groups that both
inhabit and visit the city.
The program currently planned for the YBG site includes
the 300,000-square-foot underground Moscone Convention Center
with its equally large underground expansion, and the
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recently completed 1500-room Marriott Hotel. It also
anticipates three major office buildings to contain 1.5-
million square feet of space, retail shops including a cinema
and other entertainment facilities, a cultural center, a 750-
seat theater, 10 acres of elegantly landscaped public gardens
and open spaces, a child care center, a carousel, a
children's museum, and the new home of the San Francisco
Museum of Modern Art. Construction on the public amenities
has started, while anticipated dates for construction and
completion of the private improvements are still in
negotiation.
Thesis Intent and Organization
Over the past twenty years, city governments have become
increasingly involved in partnerships with private
development companies in order to maximize the value and
utility of publicly owned developable land. They have sought
partnerships as a means of benefitting from the expertise of
private developers in constructing, operating, and
maintaining structures of public significance. From a
financial perspective, the city's goals have often been to
manage the public risk and responsibilities for the end
product, while simultaneously providing public amenities
designed to further public policy objectives.
This thesis examines the key elements of the business
strategy employed by the SFRA in its partnership with O&Y to
construct, operate, and maintain the YBG development.
12
Throughout the extensive negotiations, three issues were of
particular significance: (1) whether the SFRA should sell or
lease the land, (2) how responsibilities for providing
various amenities and public facilities would be divided
between public and private parties, and (3) how the money
paid to the SFRA for the private development rights would be
spent to achieve public objectives. 1 After years of intense
negotiations, these issues were resolved by creating a
conditional phasing plan which would transfer the development
rights to the private developer over time, in concert with
funding needs of the SFRA for construction and maintenance of
the public amenities.
The central theme of this thesis is that the city's
business strategy represents a form of entrepreneurial risk-
taking. The conceptual strategy implemented by the SFRA in
its selection of and negotiation with the developer was
formulated to insure completion of the public amenities, the
Yerba Buena Gardens (YBG), while simultaneously managing the
risks and responsibilities assumed by the public sector. How
this strategy was translated into business terms in order to
establish mutual objectives for both the public and private
side, how it has evolved throughout the process, and how it
has been an effective risk-management tool for the SFRA are
the central issues explored in this thesis. The
generalizable question is how the strategy might be applied
to other public-private partnerships.
Chapter One describes the long history of the project
and analyzes its impact on the current public pressures faced
by the SFRA to produce the YBG public amenities. These
pressures have resulted in a definite conceptual business
strategy to manage public risk and responsibility while
maintaining flexibility and control over the assets.
Chapter Two describes this business strategy, which we
have termed the "phasing and bucket strategy, " and explains
how the SFRA used the strategy to prioritize the
construction, operation, and maintenance of the public
amenities and insure that the objectives of the program are
met.
Chapter Three analyzes how the strategy has weathered
time and evaluates its effectiveness in maintaining the goals
embodied in the original 1984 Disposition and Development
Agreement with the private developer.
Chapter Four interprets the SFRA's actions as a means of
public risk-taking. What does it mean for a public entity to
take risks? What behavior of a public entity indicates that
it is taking risks? This chapter evaluates the effectiveness
of the SFRA's strategy in managing the project's risks --
development, financial, operating, political, and economic.
It also works toward developing an analytic framework to
address these questions.
Chapter Five applies the analytic framework to the
SFRA's business strategy for the YBG development. How viable
is this strategy for managing public risk-taking? What has
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the SFRA learned from implementing YBG? In what ways can the
characteristics of this concept be applied to other public-
private joint ventures?
EXHIBIT 0.1
Plan of the City of San Francisco
Legend:
1. Market Street
2. Financial district
3. Yerba Buena Center
(South of Market)
4. Tenderloin
5. Chinatown
6. Golden Gateway Project
7. North Beach
8. Mission Bay (SP Project)
9. Civic Center/City Hall
10. Mission district
11. Western Addition
12. Haight-Ashbury
13. Golden Gate Park
14. Bayview/Hunters Point
15. Candlestick Park
16. Cow Palace
City and County of San Francisco
City and County of San Francisco (courtesy of San Francisco Department
of City Planning).
EXHIBIT 0.2
Plan of Downtown San Francisco and YBC-
Legend:
1. Moscone Convention Center
2. GSA site 149 Fourth St.),
site of orooosed Marriott Hotel
3. Proposed site for new
domea stadium
4. Union Square
5. TODCO housing
6. International Hotel
7. Gooaman Building
8. City Hall
CB-1 Central Block 1
CB-2 Central Block 2
CB-3 Central Block 3
EB-2 East Block 2
Yerba Buena Center project
Financial district
Downtown San Francisco
Downtown San Francisco (courtesy of San Francisco Department of
City Planning).
EXHIBIT 0.3
Area Plan of YBC and YBG
Yerba Buena Center
4j AREA PLAN
Source: San Francisco Redevelopment Agency
CHAPTER ONE
CONTROVERSY LEADS TO PUBLIC POLICY CHOICES
No analysis of YBG would be complete without some
understanding of the complicated 30-year long struggle which
shaped the city's public-private deal. In fact, the legacy
of the SFRA's efforts to realize the redevelopment project
was perhaps the strongest motivation in creating a strategy
that could cope with myriad risks -- financial, political,
construction, and operations -- entailed in a project of this
scope.
Three Decades of Effort
To fully understand the impacts of the YBG history on
the current deal, there are three important items to note.
(The details of the complicated history are presented in
Appendix B.) First, the current public amenity program
represents a concept in constant evolution, from 1953 to
1991, and now includes a significant cultural element
encompassing permanent art displays, a performing arts
center, and the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. Second,
almost all of the housing sites have been eliminated from the
plan for the Central Blocks. Third, the SFRA has shown its
willingness to take on financial risks relating to the
private improvements.
The long struggle to realize some public benefits from
the downtown site began in 1953. Interested citizens and
government officials have proposed a number of different
programs for the development. Early planners, citing the
goal of downtown economic revival, proposed large-scale
business-oriented developments. These invariably included
office buildings, a hotel, a convention center, a sports
arena, and parking. Of course, this type of plan did not sit
well with the citizen groups who fought to replace the low-
cost housing that was razed in the YBG area under the guise
of the federal urban renewal program.
The conflicts resulted in numerous legal battles during
the late 1960s and 1970s. These were fought to determine
both the fate of the displaced residents and a programmatic
mix that would provide important public benefits, without
subjecting the public to excessive cost. Citizen groups were
eventually successful in requiring the SFRA to replace the
housing that was lost, but they were not successful in
securing a low-rent housing component within the YBG program.
Other lawsuits challenged the propriety of the Agency's
various financing plans and underlying political power
struggles added additional spice to the efforts to protect
the diverse public interests in the site. The first plans to
finance the large-scale public amenity package (including the
convention center, sports arena, and recreation and park
spaces) proposed a $219 capital expenditure to be funded by a
$225-million SFRA bond issue2 (Exhibit 1.1) .
The revenues to pay off the bonds would be generated
from land rents from leases with private developers for sites
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in the YBG area, income from the public facilities, a hotel
tax allocation, and a property tax increment. 3 This plan did
not survive the legal challenge intact and resulted in the
elimination of the sports arena from the program. 4 Whether
or not the public arguments were correct, that there would be
insufficient revenues to support the public amenities, the
fact remained that the public goals were dependent, by
design, on private large-scale development.
The delays from the legal challenges and the City's
strong desire to build a convention center facility led to
the City's take over responsibility for construction of the
convention center. As soon as the last legal hurdle was
cleared, the City issued $97 million in bonds to construct
the convention center.
The Developer Selection Process
With the convention center component of the project
underway, the SFRA issued a Request for Qualifications (RFQ)
Program Agreement in April 1980 to local, national, and
international developers interested in bidding for
development rights on the remainder of the three Central
Blocks and the one East Block (hereafter referred to as the
Central Blocks). The RFQ set out the SFRA's objectives for.
the area:
The Agency desires to develop a complex set of uses
of a uniquely San Franciscan character that will be
an asset to the City and downtown, complement and
create a generally supportive setting for the
George R. Moscone Convention Center, provide an
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environment attractive to our City's working
population -- be a place where people will come to
enjoy lunch, where families will spend an
afternoon, where our citizens will meet and browse
through markets and shops, as well as being a focal
point for our many visitors -- a place to stay, to
shop, dine, and be entertained. A city of great
physical charm with significant cultural assets and
creative talents, San Francisco provides an
opportunity for the developer to take advantage of
these attractions and create a unique environment
for our City.5
Despite the recommendation in 1976 of a Mayor's
committee of interested citizens that the program contain a
significant housing component, 6 the SFRA did not envision a
low-rent housing component as part of the public amenity
package. The desired development program for YBG set out in
the RFQ included:
'An 800-room to 1500-room hotel;
*A minimum of 260,000 square feet of retail/
entertainment/amusement use;
*A minimum of 50,000 square feet of cultural use;
-Up to 500,000 square feet of office space;
eUp to 500 units of residential use on CB-1;
eDeveloper discretion as to residential units on the
other blocks, additional cultural use, recreational
use, and parking.7
In addition to the cultural facilities, the public
amenities included 10 acres of park-like open space described
as an "urban garden" available for fairs, special exhibits
and performances.8
After reviewing the qualifications of the ten developers
who responded to the RFQ, the SFRA narrowed the field to two
finalists: Cadillac-Fairview and the team of
O&Y/Marriott/Beverly Willis. 9 From the Agency's perspective,
the strengths of Cadillac-Fairview were its extensive
experience in large mixed-use development projects and its
design team's expertise in creating people-oriented active
spaces.1 0 The strengths of the O&Y/Marriott/Willis team were
its ability to complete projects in tight time frames, its
reputation for honoring commitments, and its willingness to
be flexible.
O&Y gets the Brass Ring
In November 1980, the team of O&Y/Marriott/Willis
(hereafter O&Y/Marriott, since Willis as a limited partner
has no day-to-day decision-making power) was selected for
exclusive negotiating rights for the YBC Central Blocks. 1 1
The SFRA noted that both finalists had the necessary
financial capacity to build large and complex projects, the
experience with public-private partnerships, a design team
with the ability to create large people-oriented mixed-use
projects, and the skills to implement a special project such
as YBG. The Agency chose O&Y/Marriott, however, for several
additional reasons:
eA demonstrated sensitivity to the projects needs and
ability to respond positively to the Agency's
concerns;
*A team with exceptional creativity in community arts
and recreation program;
-A qualified project executive;
-A design team with experience in cultural,
entertainment, amusement and recreational uses;
-A team that can work successfully with the large
diversity of groups in San Francisco.12
The initial negotiations between the SFRA and the
selected team began in December 1980 and lasted 3 years. In
April 1984, the negotiators announced an agreement of basic
financial terms including construction costs, lease revenues,
and tax increments. After the agreement was announced,
numerous presentations were then made to citizen groups on
the proposed business terms of the Disposition and
Development Agreement (DDA) and the programmatic plan for
Yerba Buena Gardens, as well as the public amenities.1 The
agreement was signed on December 19, 1984, by Mayor Dianne
Feinstein .14 Since 1984, both the program and the financial
structure of the DDA have been renegotiated several times.
Details of the 1984 business negotiations and subsequent deal
changes are further discussed and analyzed in Chapters Two
and Three.
The 1984 YBG Program
The 1984 proposed YBG program, estimated to cost $104.5
million (Exhibit 1.1), resulted from the match of public
desires and private development deemed necessary to generate
the revenues necessary to provide the desired public
amenities. The major proposed uses were purposely
interlocked -- both physically and financially -- in order to
help the SFRA manage the risk that O&Y might not fulfill its
obligations for the public amenities. From the perspectives
of the developer, business community, citizen groups, and
public officials, the cultural facilities became the key to
the project's success, the symbol assuring all that the
project would reflect San Francisco's unique character. 15 The
proposed program (Exhibit 1.2) included:
-10 acres of plazas and gardens;
-100,000 square feet of cultural facilities;
-340 to 540 units of residential units;
-160,000 to 200,000 square feet of retail;
*Two office towers containing 1,250,000 square feet of
office space
-1,500 hotel rooms;
*170,000 square feet of Amusement/Recreation/
Entertainment (ARE);
-2,300 parking spaces.'6
As presented in an axonometric site plan by the SFRA
(Exhibit 1.3), the magnitude of the public amenity component
has a much stronger visual impact than the height and mass of
the hotel and office towers. This was probably done
purposefully to show that the SFRA was working toward
tangible public objectives in order muster public support for
the YBG project. It also leads to the interpretation that
public opinion concerning the development had had a strong
impact on the SFRA's behavior and would probably continue to
do so.
The Historical Legacy
To evaluate the public objectives for this
redevelopment, it is first necessary to identify the
"public." In San Francisco, this question is particularly
relevant since traditionally strong population diversity has
been a defining element of public debate, creating an almost
extreme tension between the forces of rapid change and
continuation of tradition.
It is clear from the long embroiled history of the YBG
development 7 that these forces have been at work since the
project was first proposed in 1953. On the one extreme are
those who sought retribution for the seemingly senseless
destruction of a residential neighborhood. On the other
extreme are those whose interests in the rapid completion of
the convention, hotel, and office facilities represented the
desire for enhancement of San Francisco's business climate
and attraction as a place for private investment. It has
been the City's job, through its own actions and the
activities of the SFRA, to represent these diverse interests
by using its publicly owned land to produce benefits that
serve the interests of the public as a whole while minimizing
the financial risks to the resident taxpayers. This has been
a difficult balancing act indeed.
Over the three decades of planning, the interests and
political power of groups within the business community,
citizen coalitions, and public offices have shifted
dramatically. This, in turn, caused the public objectives
and policy goals to be pushed and pulled, twisted and shaped
like taffy. At various points in time, economic revival of
the downtown, low-cost housing for residents, and cultural
and arts emphasis have each taken precedence as the driving.
policy force behind the progress (or lack of progress) in
achieving a redevelopment plan for YBG.
Economic Revival versus Low-cost Housing
These public policy objectives for YBG are revealed in
the variety of issues surrounding the struggle to realize the
development. But no issue has been more intense than the
initial fight over slum clearance and housing reuse. The
City's economic objectives were first expressed in the 1950s
by the original planners in their zeal to raze the "skid row"
neighborhood and replace it with a convention center for
tourist and visitor needs, a large stadium, offices, hotel,
retail stores, and 7,000-car parking garage. Because local
business interests wielded considerable power over the
elected and appointed officials at the time, these arguments
were politically palatable.18
Other public amenities sought by the SFRA in the early
evolution of the development program included parks,
pedestrian open spaces, and a 2,200-seat theater. While
these amenities represent important public objectives, the
SFRA's arguably premature actions of demolition and sluggish
response to the goals of providing quality low-rent
relocation housing for the YBC residents indicates some
insensitivity to this important public objective. It also
emphasizes the choice of the SFRA and City favoring economic
and architectural revitalization over housing. Despite the
large housing component recommended by the Mayor's committee
in 1976, the SFRA continued its efforts to implement a large-
scale commercial development plan void of any sizable
affordable housing component.
The economic policy justification became easier and
easier for the SFRA to support, in part because of the power
wielded by local business interests particularly after the
area was razed. As time passed and the housing obligations
of the SFRA to the former inhabitants were being met in other
areas of the city, even citizen coalitions who had fought so
hard to stop the project had a strong interest in realizing
some public amenity and policy benefits from the long-vacant
site.
It is easy to imagine the business pressures on both the
City and the SFRA to revitalize what was an unsightly,
predominantly industrial area "in the path of downtown
business expansion." 19  In designing a program for the
redevelopment project and in stating its objectives in the
1980 RFQ, the SFRA expressed a clear vision of the public
benefits it sought.
The Public Motivation for Tangible Results
The image of a festive urban garden filled with resident
families and visitors enjoying entertainment, shopping,
restaurants, and cultural activities has been the clear
overriding public objective. Whether or not these public
benefits justify the displacement of the former residents of
the razed neighborhood, they have now become the key
motivation and result sought. The SFRA devised the YBG deal
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strategy to insure that the cultural and public amenities
will be realized and to assure themselves that the project
will finally be judged by San Francisco residents
(particularly those who fought so hard to prevent the YBG
development) as a success.
Timely completion of the YBG cultural amenities has
become the SFRA's primary impetus in its continuing
negotiations of the Disposition and Development Agreement
with O&Y. 20  Once the housing issue was settled in the late
1970s and it became clear that the planning for the project
would proceed, citizen groups that had been opposed to the
development for so many years as well as local SOMA community
groups began to participate in the planning process with the
SFRA to insure that they would benefit from the development.
In fact, the citizen participation has been so active
that one self-proclaimed community activist is the current
president of the Redevelopment Agency Commission, 21 the group
responsible for approving SFRA decisions. Due to this level
of community participation, the SFRA's policy goals began to
focus upon both economic revival of the YBG area and
demonstrating a strong support of cultural and arts policy.
Cultural Policy Drives Today's Deal
The new politically acceptable goal became a recognition
of the cultural vitality of San Francisco, now embodied in
the proposed Yerba Buena Gardens Cultural Center (YBGCC).
Clearly, this image would also enhance the value of the
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private development rights. The reasoning was simple: the
project will be more successful if the area takes on the day-
time activity of the downtown and a vibrant weekend and night
life, making it a more desirable place to spend time for
shoppers, tourists, residents, office workers, and
conventioneers.
In San Francisco, the trend toward increasing city
support of cultural and artistic endeavors has recently been
formalized in the May 1991 Proposed Arts Policy, developed
through a community planning process begun in 1988. The goal
is to have the arts policy adopted as part of the City Master
Plan. 2 2
Several of the goals expressed in the Proposed Arts
Policy relate directly to efforts made by the SFRA to
construct the YBGCC and to operate cultural and arts
programs. One of the main goals of the community
participants is to enhance, develop, and protect the physical
environment of the arts in San Francisco.
A more directed program of facility maintenance,
creative use of non-arts city facilities and public
and private facilities partnerships will yield not
only a more stable arts community but a more
economically sound and artistically rich
environment... .New outdoor spaces should also be
encouraged through private and public
developments .... [Another policy goal is to] develop
and maintain a mid-sized downtown performing arts
facility available to community-based, culturally
diverse arts groups easily accessible to
visitors... .Agencies that have major construction
programs,such as the Port of San Francisco, the
Redevelopment Agency and the Airport, participate
in the public percent for art program but do not
necessarily have policies relative to the use of
their facilities for arts purposes. The
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Redevelopment Agency's project, Yerba Buena
Gardens, is a notable exception. 23
Clearly, the SFRA's arts policy for YBG has been
effectively communicated and supported by the community.
Because of this long-standing citizen interest and
involvement in YBG, the SFRA is under additional pressure to
produce the desired facilities in a manner that effectuates
the politically desired program.
In summary, the historical legacy of delays and
obstacles in the YBG plan have put intense public pressure on
the SFRA to produce tangible results for its many years of
effort and expense. In addition, the cultural facilities
have evolved into the symbol of community participation in
the planning process and support for the project. In turn,
these forces have pressed the SFRA to implement a business
strategy directed at realizing the public amenities as soon
as feasibly possible, while protecting the public's financial
interests in the agreement and continuing negotiations with
O&Y/Marriott.
EZIBIT 1.1
Comparative Projected Sources and Uses of YBG Construction Funds
(Estimates in millions)
1972 Plan 1984 Plan
3  1991 Plan
Uses
Convention Center S2191 Constructed by City Constructed byCt
Sports Arena N...../A - ~/A ---- -
Other Public Amenities $104.54 S97.09
Pay off HUD Loans S28.05 $16.010
Total us*& S219 S132.5 S113.0
Sources
Bond Issue - Convention Center S2251
Bond Issue - Other S28.05 516.010
Land Sale Proceeds -
CB-1 $38.56 $37.8
EB-2 ?7 $37.611
Other YBC Land Sales $29.0
Tax Increment Bonds $15.0
Hotel Tax Allocation Bonds $13.0
Marriott Lease Renegotiation $10.0
Other sources 1.612
total sources -$225 132.5 S113.0
Net Balance 562 S so
Source: Benson & Flaster, A Risk Management Strategy for.. .YBG
MIT/CRZD Thesis, 1991
Exhibit 1.1 (continued)
notes
1 - in 1974, a legal settlement reduced the maxim, bond issue to S210 million. The sports arena was eliminated to
reduce the cost of the convention center and other public amenities to $162.5 million. The low bid received on the
construction of the remaining public amenities. in 1978, the convention center was extracted from the SFRA
responsibilities. The City issued its own bonds in the amount of 597 million to construct the convention center.
2 - Information is not available to determine whether this 56 million difference between the bond issue amount and
the projected costs is attributable to fees or an interest reserve.
3 - Keyser Marston Associates, YUG Public sector Feasibility Report, October 1984.
4 - Total program hard construction and soft costs were projected to be $109 million, this included the housing fund
contribution of S5 million is subtracted to make 1984 projected costs substantially comparable to 1991 projected costs.
Keyser Marston Associates, YBG Public Sector Feasibility Report, October 1994.
5 -- To pay off NUD loans, in 1963 bonds in the amount of $28 were issued for a seven-year term, secured by a letter of
credit. Payments were to be made from a combination of tax increment receipts and revenues from the sales of property
outside the YBG area.
6 - Proceeds from the sale of CZ-1 included both the office parcel and the residential units that would be sold several
years in the future. The base price of $32.5 million for the office parcel represented the escalated figure. Keyser
Marston, Feasibility Report.
7 - The sale price for the EB-2 parcels was not yet determined in 1984. Estimated sale proceeds were to be used to
complete the gardens on CB-2, if necessary, and to complete public amenities on CB-3. Any remaining balance could be
placed into a housing fund.
a - Includes lease revenues and interest.
9 - Includes additional responsibility for construction of CB-3 public amenities. CB-2 public construction is
projected to total $62 million, leaving 535 million for construction of CB-3 amenities. The 597 million includes all
hard construction and soft costs for the public amenities, but does not include construction of the CB-2 west-edge
gardens or the pedestrian bridges. The projected total cost with the additional amenities is 5111.8 million.
10 - Bonds to pay off BUD loans were refinanced in 1990. The current SFRA obligation is $16 million. (See Note 2
above). Bonds will be paid off or refinanced in 3 years. The SFRA intends to use sale proceeds from the sale of an EB-
1 office site to retire the bonds.
11 - Sale prices were fixed in 1991 at $20.5 million for EB-2a and $10.5 million for ED-2c. These prices escalate with
the San Francisco construction cost index, and are projected to be sold in early 1993 for S24.6 million and $13 million,
respectively.
12 - Other projected sources of funds include $6.9 million of interest earnings, a $3 million payment from a Moscone
Convention Center refinancing, and a tax increment receipt of $1.7 million. These revenues are dependent on interest
rates and timing of payments. The pro3ections are based on construction through 1994.
EXHIBIT 1.2
YERBA BUENA GARDENS
1984 Program and Construction Responsibility
Central Block 1: CB-1
*Convention Hotel - 1500 rooms
-Office Building - 750,000 sf
-Residential - 40 units
'Retail - 100,000 sf
Central Block 2: CB-2
-Cultural Facilities - 100,000 sf
eGardens - 60% open space
+Amusement, Recreation, and
Entertainment (ARE) - 78,000 sf of
nightclub(s), ice rink, childrens
learning area
-Retail - 70,000 sf
-Hotel meeting rooms - 100,000 sf
underground
eParking - 1,250 spaces
Central Block 3: CB-3
-Amusement, Recreation, and
Entertainment (ARE) - 100,000 sf of
cinema center, technology pavillion
cabaret(s), nightclub(s)
-Retail - 15,000 sf
*Gardens - 30% to 40% open space
-Convention Center Expansion -
85, 000 sf (City responsibility)
Developer
Construction
Responsibility
*CB-1 - All
-CB-2 - ARE,
Retail, Hotel,
Parking
-CB-3 - ARE and
Retail
eEB-2 - All
East Block
2: EB-2
*Office -
500,000 sf
*Residential -
500 units
'Possible
Museum
SFRA
Construction
Responsibility
eCB-2 - Gardens,
Cultural
-CB-3 - Gardens
Source: Benson & Flaster, A Risk Management Strategy for.. .YBG
MIT/CRED Thesis, 1991
EXHIBIT 1.3
Axonometric of 1984 Program
1. Festival Plaza' Esplanade
2. Starlight Garden
3. St. Patrick s Square
4. larket Street Forecourt
5. Marriott
Contention Hotel
6. Olympia and lbrk
Ofice Touer 1
7. Retail. Shops.
Restaurants. Cafes
8. Ice Rink
9. Cultural
10. San Francisco Pailion
and Cinema
11. Convention Center and
Meeting Rooms
12. Learning Garden
13. Ohnpia and 1brk
Ofice Touer II
14. Residential
Plaza and Gardens
10 acres
Cultural
100,000 square feet
Residential
340-540 units
Retail
160.000-200.000
squarefeet
Office- 7hyo Touers
1.250.000 square feet
Hotel
1.500 rooms
Yerba Buena Gardens
Source: San Francisco Redevelopment Agency
Amusement/ Recreation
Entertainment
170.000 square feet
Parking
2,300 spaces
CHAPTER TWO
THE "PHASING/BUCKETS" STRUCTURE AS A BUSINESS STRATEGY
In negotiating and implementing the 1984 agreement with
YBGA, the SFRA was trading the value of publicly owned land
in exchange for YBGA's expertise in developing the public
amenities. What the SFRA clearly wanted was an exciting,
inviting and usable public center, and it chose the
O&Y/Marriott team based, in part, on its "exceptional
creativity and excellence". 2 4 In taking on such a large
mixed-use project, the SFRA needed to devise a strategy that
prioritized the staging and development of the public
amenities to insure that the City's objectives would be met.
This chapter will explain how that framework, developed
through the three-year negotiation process and formalized in
the 1984 deal, was designed to give the SFRA some security
that the public amenities would be constructed, maintained,
and operated in the public's best interest. This was
achieved through a business strategy that combined a phased
selling of development rights with a financial plan we call
the "buckets" concept.
Picture a series of buckets: After water has filled up
the first bucket, it spills or flows into the next bucket.
As that one fills up, the water flows into the third bucket.
And so on. And so on. The buckets represent the control
mechanisms in the deal, and the water represents construction
funding for the public amenities and the revenue stream
generated from the private development to fund the operation
and maintenance of the public amenities.
The buckets strategy evolved from a central premise:
Link the development rights with the developer's obligations
in such a way as to insure construction of the public
amenities package. The sale of land and associated
development rights would be tied to the public objectives,
with receipt of sale proceeds timed to coincide with the
SFRA's funding needs for constructing the public amenities.
This was the way for the SFRA to manage the risk that the
developer would walk away from the deal before the public
amenities were completed because the firm had gotten what it
wanted early in the process. The revenue stream from the
leased parcels and SFRA participation in the returns of the
private development were also dedicated and their use
prioritized so that maintenance of the public amenities would
be assured.
Translating Policy Goals Into Business Terms
The 1984 agreement between the SFRA and YBGA, as
detailed in the Disposition And Development Agreement (DDA),
was the product of an arduous negotiation process. It was
shaped by the need for the SFRA to create sufficient
incentives for private development, yet still secure the
following public interests: Fair land values given the
proposed uses and level of risk; quality design,
construction, and operation; and the completion of
obligations by the developer.
The purpose of the DDA and the volumes of other legal
and supporting documents were to define the series of events
and responsibilities of each party in order for the public-
private partnership to realize the completion and successful
operation of the YBG development. The various documents
describe in great detail the methods by which land values
were determined, the terms and procedure for disposition of
land, the control and standards for design and construction,
and the general rights and obligations of each party. This
section will draw from these materials to present and discuss
three overriding business-policy principles which guided and
shaped the 1984 DDA.
The first principle was balancing density and dollars.
Since the purpose of this partnership is to leverage the
development value of the private uses, concentrated on CB-1,
to fund the public amenities, it was necessary to establish
the scale of private development that would correspond to the
anticipated economics of the desired public amenities. While
no "real financials" were used to determine this needed
development intensity, 25 there was a clear attempt to maximize
the value and development potential of the private hotel and
office parcels. 2 6  As-of-right building height limits were
increased from 80 feet to as much as 400 feet, and under-
utilized development rights were transferred from the
adjacent sites and less dense private and public
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improvements . 2 7  This served to offer YBGA more of the
development use which they perceived to be desirable, in
order to entice them to develop and operate the less
desirable retail and ARE uses, the key objective of the SFRA.
The second objective of the SFRA, as will be illustrated
by a review of the negotiations later in this chapter, was to
control the development of the public improvements, which
though funded through private sources, would be delivered
through the public agency. It was important that the Agency,
and not a private developer, be viewed as managing the
construction, operation and maintenance of the public
amenities. YBGA would be responsible for the construction,
operation, and maintenance of the commercial improvements to
the parcels which it purchased or leased.
Phasing of development was the third overriding
principle. It was employed to schedule the construction of
the project's multiple components and to mitigate the major
financial risks faced by both the public and private side.
The details of this principle will be analyzed in the
following section.
A Risk-Mitigating Structure
The mechanisms laced throughout the 1984 agreement
served to ensure, as much as possible, that each party's
interests would be met. The rights and obligations are
linked in such a way that the development cannot get ahead of
itself, and that the objectives of each party are kept in
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sync. Checks are in place to insure that the original
*objectives, or particular obligations of each phase, must be
satisfied before continuing forward. Each phase would
include interlocking and simultaneous obligations to perform
in ways that meet the objectives of each party. The team
created a series of options to activate each successive
phase. Through phasing, a framework has been established
which attempts to squeeze the development value from the
SFRA's property to fund its public improvements, while
maintaining a long-term interest in the property to insure
the operation and maintenance of these improvements. This
framework dictates (1) the development opportunity for the
private side as a partner with the SFRA, (2) the flow of
funds from the disposition of parcels to private developers
to fund the public benefits, and (3) the flow of funds from
the revenue stream of commercial components to operate and
maintain these benefits for the life of the project.
Linking Objectives Through Parcelization: The
organization of phases, and options to those phases, was
facilitated by parcelization of the 23-acre site. By
breaking up the large site into several development parcels,
clusters of parcels and related obligations could be linked
together, all the while protecting the economic value of
parcels in subsequent phases. This resulted in a series of
three phases with associated options to build-out specific
amounts of commercial development. With an initial option
payment of $4,000,000, YBGA received the right to exercise
all of the three options provided certain obligations were
met. The option for each phase, unless otherwise approved by
the SFRA, could be exercised only if the option to the
preceding phase had been exercised. The options consisted of
the rights to the lease and/or purchase of specific portions
of the site by YBGA from the SFRA.28 Exhibit 2.1 describes
the terms of the 1984 agreement. The significant
construction and operating obligations are as follows:
Phase 1 of the development consisted of the hotel
facilities at ground level on CB-1 and underground CB-2. The
terms of the initial 60-year lease would provide the SFRA
with annual land rent to be used for the continued operation
of the public improvements. YBGA would build, operate and
maintain the hotel facilities.
Phase 2 & Phase 2R (residential) represented a complex
variety of private and public uses. YBGA would purchase the
office parcel on CB-1 and the residential parcel on CB-1.
These proceeds would be used to fund the construction of the
public amenities on CB-2. YBGA would also lease the parcels
proposed for retail, ARE uses, and parking on the remainder
of CB-1, CB-2 and CB-3. These revenues, along with
participation in the office and residential buildings, would
help to fund the operation of the public improvements on CB-2
and CB-3. The Developer would be responsible for building,
operating and maintaining the above private uses in Phase 2.
The Cultural Facilities and Gardens on CB-2 (and CB-3 if
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funding became available from the sale of EB-2 or other
sources) would be completed with Phase 2, and the SFRA would
be responsible for building, operating and maintaining these
facilities with the funds described above. The City would be
responsible for building, operating and maintaining the
Convention Center addition on CB-2 (underground).
Phase 3 would consist of the sale of the office parcel
on EB-2 and the residential parcel on EB-2. Each parcel
would be sold separately either to YBGA or another entity,
with YBGA having a right of first refusal in each case. The
purchaser of each EB-2 parcel would be responsible for the
construction, operations and maintenance of the property in
conformance with the agreement. The DDA included a
contingency for a museum on EB-2. YBGA, upon the Agency's
selection, would negotiate in good faith with a museum entity
to occupy a portion of the site, but would have no financial
obligation with respect to the museum facility or entity.29
It had been anticipated that Phase 1 and 2 would proceed
as soon as possible. Prior to the signing of the DDA,
however, O&Y canceled the planned 1984 ground-breaking for
the CB-1 office tower, citing that the rental market was too
soft to justify construction. The 1984 DDA called for the
construction schedule as shown in Exhibit 2.2.
The CB-1 hotel and office parcels, located on Market
Street closest to the existing financial center, were clearly
the focus of YBGA's primary development objectives and the
key source of its long-term returns. Because these parcels
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would fund the public improvements, it was also logical to
build and complete them first. The SFRA, therefore, tied
their own objectives to the private development rights of the
CB-1 parcels. Joseph Coomes, the attorney representing the
SFRA throughout the negotiation process, described the SFRA's
scheduling interest using a train analogy: "[CB-1] was the
locomotive and the garden and cultural were the caboose, and
[the SFRA] wanted the caboose to leave the station with the
locomotive. "30
At YBGA's request, the Marriott Hotel would be the first
phase of the development. With the combination of a weak
rental market for office space and the completion of the
City's Convention Center, the hotel seemed to present the
least risk. The SFRA also granted YBGA's request to next
proceed with the office building ahead of the retail and ARE,
provided that they be linked. Several controls were included
in the 1984 DDA to insure that the gardens, retail, and ARE
were done with the office building on CB-1, the essence of
what would be Phase 2. Further, the Agency would reserve a
right of reverter when they conveyed the office parcel(s) .31
In order to make the reverter meaningful, the developer's
initial financing of the land cost, as well as the
construction cost, would be limited to a maximum mortgage of
80% and a minimum of 20% equity. 32
YBGA would be required to meet several conditions for
Phase 2 in advance of purchase the CB-1 office building site,
including: Completion of the design and commitment to the
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timely construction of the retail on CB-1, CB-2, and CB-3,
the ARE on CB-2 and CB-3, and the parking on CB-2. The
conditions for obtaining a certificate of completion to
occupy the CB-1 office building required that YBGA at the
same time complete the shell for the retail and ARE uses, or
otherwise post security to assure completion. 33 Upon meeting
the obligations of these phases, YBGA would next have the
option of proceeding, through the right of first refusal for
the EB-2 parcels, Phase 3.
With the deal structured as a series of options, the
option for a particular phase of development could not be
exercised until the obligations of the preceding phase were
met. For example, if YBGA did not proceed with Phase 1, the
hotel, it would lose the balance of the project, plus
$1,000,000 of its $4,000,000 option deposit. If they
proceeded with Phase 1 but not Phase 2, they would lose
$4,000,000 plus the plans and specifications for the CB-1
office building (estimated to be $10 million at the scheduled
conveyance date) and their rights to the balance of the
project. If they proceeded with Phase 1 and 2, but failed to
proceed with Phase 3, they would forfeit 50% of the option
deposit, $2,000,000.34 Through the series of linkages and
option-sequence requirements such as these, the SFRA created
incentives and mechanisms that would commit YBGA to a
schedule geared toward satisfying the interests of both
public and private parties.
Creating a Flow of Funds: This phasing of private
development and the sale of parcels was designed to provide
the SFRA with funds to meet the needs for its capital
improvements. The commercial improvements, through lease and
participation revenue, would then provide a continuous flow
of funds for the operation and maintenance of the public
improvements. The flow of funds can be compared to a series
of buckets; The funds in one bucket must be full before
money can go on to the next bucket. 35  This concept can
clearly be seen in the flow of funds from each of two special
accounts presented in Exhibits 2.3 and 2.4.
The proceeds from the sale of the office parcel and the
residential parcel on CB-1 would be placed into a special
Capital Account. The SFRA would then draw money from this
account for the following public improvements as illustrated
in order of priority in the Capital Flow Of Funds, Exhibit
2.3. The first three of these to receive funds, the two
gardens and the cultural facility, were deemed essential by
the developer as the core of the public improvements that
were needed to proceed with the project. 3 6  The anticipated
(but not guaranteed) proceeds from the sale of EB-2, other
SFRA funds (including tax increments), and the City's
contribution to CB-3 from a refinancing of the Moscone
Convention Center bonds would also be placed into the Capital
Account. These proceeds would then be used to complete the
CB-2 gardens (if necessary), the CB-3 Gardens and the
Cultural Buildings, with any remainder contributed to a
housing fund.37
Participation in the profits from the office building(s)
and all rental income from the leased parcels on CB-1, CB-2
and CB-3 would be placed into a special account to finance
annual expenditures for the security, operations and
maintenance of the Gardens and Cultural facilities (GSOM and
CSOM). The developer also agreed to pay 20% of the annual
budget of GSOM. The funds from this account were committed
in order of priority as illustrated in the Operating Flow of
Funds, Exhibit 2.4.
A Fit, Finally, For Both Sides
To fully understand the implications and the reasoning
behind the structure of this agreement, it is important to
unravel the business negotiations between the SFRA and YBGA.38
The business terms were not developed in isolation from the
negotiations over the design and scope of the project. The
SFRA's plan was to capture the private development value of
CB-1, through sale proceeds and lease revenue, and use it to
fund the public improvements on CB-2 and CB-3. Therefore, it
was important that the scale of the private development
relate to the anticipated economics of the desired public
amenities.
There were two major issues which would determine the
role of the SFRA in the construction and the continued
operation of the project: development control and long-term
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land ownership. First, to what extent would the SFRA
construct, operate and maintain the public improvements?
Originally, the developers offered to build, operate and
maintain the entire project. For a number of reasons, not
the least of which was the concern that the SFRA might be
perceived as giving the land away, the Agency rejected this
initial offer. This led to the logical separation of public
and private uses and their respective responsibilities. The
SFRA would build, operate and maintain the public
improvements, while YBGA would build, operate and maintain
the private uses and portions of the common area and
circulation.
The second major point concerned land ownership and the
flow of funds relating to each use -- would the parcels be
sold or leased, and how much value was there in these
development sites? If the SFRA chose to sell all of the land
which was intended for private development, it believed it
would be giving up future opportuniti.es for the public. On
the other hand, they needed to sell some parcels in order to
generate the necessary up-front capital for the construction
of the public amenities on a pay-as-you-go (versus bonding)
basis. The solution was to divide the property into deeded
and leased parcels. (As a developer of major office
buildings, O&Y had an interest in owning the office parcels
in order to maintain a significant long-term presence in the
San Francisco market.) The disposition price was determined
by a combination of the allowable building area and
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comparable rents and prices in San Francisco. The profit-
sharing participation which the SFRA negotiated for the
office building would provide the public with future benefits
from the property even though the land would be sold.
The solution to sell certain parcels and lease others
was a natural match, structurally, with the SFRA's cash flow
needs for its stated responsibilities. The sale proceeds
would be placed into the Capital Account for construction of
the public benefits and the annual revenues from leases and
participation would be placed into the special account for
GSOM and CSOM.
This solution not only dictated the way in which land
was to be conveyed and transferred, but it had other
important implications for the private developer. YBGA felt
that the gardens, if properly designed, constructed and
maintained, would be a crucial element in making the project
work as a destination center, which is why they initially
proposed to build, operate and maintain them. Further, YBGA
wanted to do all that it could to protect itself from the
very real possibility that San Francisco might change its
view on development objectives -- specifically -- what the
City might do with future project revenues. With the
"buckets" solution, the funds that the developer pays into
both the capital and operating accounts are contractually
committed and prioritized for the garden and cultural
elements. Additionally, the 20% contribution that YBGA makes
to the annual budget of GSOM brings them a certain degree of
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influence over the the construction, operations and
maintenance of the gardens. These spending valves, integral
to the bucket strategy, work to meet the developer's
objectives that the gardens get built, and that they get
built according to plans and standards that will protect or
enhance their private investment.
In hindsight, this solution and its elements may seem
conceptually simple, but its logic and structure, not
immediately apparent at the start of negotiations,
crystalized the flow of funds strategy and gave direction to
resolving other matters. Joseph Coomes reflected on this
solution. "This technique, the concept of the buckets and
the special [accounts], was a major solution that led the way
to a resolution of a lot of the other economic issues between
us."
Balancing Control & Flexibility
The matter of control versus flexibility, an intense
issue of negotiation, can perhaps be described best with a
generalization: Each party wanted flexibility with respect
to their own responsibilities while exercising control over
the responsibilities of the party seated across the table.
The SFRA's desire for control and certainty -- with
respect to the construction and operation of the private
improvements -- often came in direct conflict with the
developer's quest for design, financing, and operational
flexibility. The mixed-use nature of the program called for
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uses with which YBGA had little experience -- retail and ARE,
-in particular. Due to their speculative nature,
specifically, the ARE, YBGA wanted the flexibility to bring
in the appropriate expertise and methods of financing as
needed. They consistently took the position that they would
not stay in the project forever, and that it was in the best
interest of the project to bring in new entities
(equity/participant lenders, anchor tenants, or master
operators) at any stage of the process, but especially during
the financing stage. Pamela Duffy, Attorney for YBGA recalls
that it became a key element during negotiations. "The
[SFRA's] continued refrain was, 'you are the master developer
who made the bid,' and the developers continued refrain was,
'if you don't think we know what we are doing then why did
you pick us? If you think you can do this, do it yourself.
We know what we are doing, we have international reputations,
you don't [have to] worry; we are not three airline pilots
building a tasty-freeze.'" 3 9
The Agency's interests are illustrated by a letter
written to the YBGA team during the master developer
selection process. It suggested that because of the
uniqueness of the retail uses, an experienced entity should
be identified to manage and operate such uses.40  (By 1984,
the Rouse Company, known for its urban retail centers,
(Faneuil Hall in Boston and Harbor Place in Baltimore) had
joined the development team. 4 1 ) The Agency encouraged the
developer's use of experts to ensure the projects success,
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but it wanted YBGA to have the ultimate responsibility for
constructing the private uses.
After much negotiation on this issue, a compromise was
reached which allowed YBGA to transfer rights to related
entities, provided control was exercised through O&Y. As
part of that deal, a capped guarantee was required from O&Y's
parent, O&Y N.Y. Corp., 'for 25% of construction cost to
further back up construction obligations. Further,
assignment was restricted during construction, to anchor
tenants, master operators, and institutional lenders, though
it would be allowed more freely during the operations phase
of the project.
Design control was another critical negotiation issue.
Each party wanted some degree of control over the other
party's improvements as their decisions would directly affect
the image of the entire project. The SFRA viewed this as
perhaps the most critical aspect of their public-interest
responsibilities. Because of its inherent visibility,
permanence, and international exposure, the design would be
the most likely subject of public criticism for the life of
the project -- and thus, a statement of the SFRA's competence
and skill in managing the project. The casual visitor or
tourist would view the success of the project by its physical
characteristics or sense of place, one of the SFRA's key
objectives, rather than by the financial returns to either
private or public entities.
These public interests yielded an agreement which gave
the SFRA substantial design control. All architects would be
subject to their approval, and the SFRA staff and Commission
had approval power over the design of all improvements,
limited to the exterior in the case of the privately built
structures. Detailed design concept drawings that
illustrated the massing, scale, materials, and general
project image were approved with the signing of the DDA. Any
subsequent evolution of the designs following these initial
concepts required approval by the SFRA.
The issue of control was, of course, reversed over the
terms of the design for the public improvements. As stated
earlier, in exchange for their 20% contribution to the GSOM
budget, YBGA was granted a certain degree of influence over
the construction, operation, and maintenance of the public
improvements, as they would directly affect the image of the
retail and ARE.
Each party wanted and received equal measures of control
and flexibility with respect to potential marketplace
failures. The Cultural Center, on the public side, and the
ARE, on the private side, were untried uses and as such
presented each side with a high degree of risk. To offset
some of this risk, each party had the right to convert the
use if it failed, after first offering the other party the
right to step in and operate those uses.
Making Ends Meet
Because the public entities and private firms have
inherently different objectives, priorities, and perceptions
of development value, public-private partnerships can create
opportunity and reduce risk for both sides. The private
side, for example, often trades portions of its future
operating revenues in exchange for reduced predevelopment
risk with respect to land acquisition and government
approvals. This was the case with YBG.
As a public agency in control of the land, the
predevelopment risk to the SFRA was not as significant
because it was more controllable, and was apparently worth
accepting in return for a lower subsequent risk in operating
the public amenities. A more specific example of
interlocking interests is the priority of the construction
and maintenance of the central Esplanade Garden on CB-2.
This garden is the focus of the public amenities package, yet
it is also crucial to the success of YBGA's retail and ARE
uses on EB-2. The fact that the Esplanade Garden would be
the first amenity to receive capital funds, as well as
operating funds, illustrates how the interests of each side
were often interlocked to the benefit of each party.
The structure of this agreement clearly seems to meet,
in concurrent fashions, the public and private needs of the
partnership. As the attorneys representing each side
describe below, the neat fit was not always so clear:
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According to Pamela Duffy, attorney for YBGA:
It might have been better if at the outset, [we
had] a better understanding of the degree to
which either party had to have flexibility on
certain issues and control on others.. .We spent
four months captive to accountants and
economists and appraisers.. .The solution, the
participation solution, could have been reached
very quickly.
Joseph Coomes, attorney for the SFRA, commented:
[There were] numerous times when principals
would argue for hours and, finally, the other
side would understand the real reason for the
request, and say: 'Oh that's your problem, lets
work to solve it'...There were a lot of
communication gaps. Misunderstanding and
ignorance is worse than candor in these
situations.
Duffy concluded:
There is a certain level of mutual suspicion,
sometimes, when the public agency and private
developer meet across the table, [suspicion]
that does not exist in a private deal. Quickly
eliminating the one-upsmanship can be very
productive.
The business principles which guided the City's
negotiations with its private development partner ultimately
yielded a workable plan of action. The result of a three-
year negotiation process, the 1984 DDA embodied resolution of
both the control and flexibility issues and a mechanism for
sharing the financial risks of the project. It reflected the
SFRA's public-interest objectives, while at the same time it
met the private developer's objectives so necessary for
funding those public goals. The flow of funds "bucket"
concept was crafted to meet the needs for the public
improvements through construction and operation. The
parcelization of the property into phases allowed the SFRA to
tailor the flow of development opportunity into a series of
options which would provide the needed funds. These options
provided the desired level of control, for the SFRA, and
flexibility, for YBGA. The phasing allows the SFRA to tie
their objectives to YBGA's development rights, yet YBGA has
no obligation to go forward with a given phase/option until
the design approvals, financing, and master operators are in
place. YBGA's real return for sharing their future private
revenues, which they will pay fair market value to achieve,
is flexibility and a decreased level of predevelopment risk
because that risk is shared with the public.
The DDA was approved by the SFRA Commission on October
30, 1984, and by the City Board of Supervisors on December
10, 1984. One week-later, the Mayor signed the agreement
triggering a potential construction start for the hotel in
1986 and the office building in 1988. With total costs of
the public improvements estimated at $104.5 and construction
scheduled to begin in 1988, the partnership and their
relationship still had a long way to go. Would the "buckets"
framework act as the glue to hold the deal together and
sustain the inevitable political, physical, and economic
changes, or would it fall victim to the process and become
outdated?
EXHIBIT 2.1
DEVELOPMENT PHASING
AS INTERPRETED FROM THE 1984 DISPOSITION AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3
SALE OF CB-1 Office EB-2 Office
PARCELS & USES CB-1 Residential (To be sold EB-2 Residential (these
YBGA to: as condominiums) parcels to be sold
Purchase, build, separately, YBGA has
and operate right of first refusal)
SALE & CB-1 Office Price - EB-2 Office Price - Fair
PARTICIPATION $32,497,500 (to be Market Value at the time.
TERMS adjusted annually to S.F. 8% participation payment
construction index); 8% to SFRA after 15%
participation payment to preferred return to YBGA.
SFRA after 15% preferred EB-2 Res. Price - Fair
return to YBGA. Market Value at the time.
CB-1 Res. Price - $1,476,000 Profit sharing equal to
(to be adjusted annually 30% of YBGA's net profit
to S.F. construction from unit sales.
index). Profit sharing
equal to 30% of YBGA's
net profit from unit
sales.
LEASE OF CB-1 Hotel and Meeting CB-1, CB-2, & CB-3 Retail
PARCELS A USES facilities underground A.R.E. and Parking
YBGA to: lease, CB-2
build and
operate,
LEASE & Holding Rent - $325,000 Retail base rent of $1 per
PARTICIPATION ($500,000 after opening) sq. ft. and escalating
TERMS Min. Rent - $1,050,000 rent after 20% preferred
($1,500,000 after 8 return
years) A.R.E. same as retail but no
Percentage rent - 4% gross base rent.
room sales and 2% of Parking rent equal to 50% of
other sales net cash flow
PUBLIC USES CB-2 & CB-3 Gardens and
SFRA to: build, Cultural facilities
and operate. II
Source: Benson & Flaster, A Risk Management Strategy For.. .YBG
MIT/CRED Thesis, 1991
EXHIBIT 2.2
Capital Structure & Construction Schedule Of YBG
As Per The 1984 DDA
Timeline
Conveyance d
Construction
Purchase
Build &
Operate
(YB GA)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
S-------------------------------------------------------,
I::::......... ........................
..................
u. :..CB-1 Residential
...............
. ..............
Lease
Build £
Operate
(YBGA)
Sale Proceeds
Lease Revenue
Public
Improvements
Build &
Operate
(SFRA)
Capital Account
---
/EB-2 Resident ial/7
- - - -- - - Capital Funds
Operating Funds
(Leases and
participation)
Phase 1
U Phase 2
1I Phase 3
Source: Benson & Flaster
A Risk Management Strategy For... YBG
MIT/CRED Thesis, 1991
EXHIBIT 2.3
CAPITAL FLOW OF FUNDS
Source: 3enson & J1wster
A Risk Mnagement Strategy ror . . YG3
MIT/C3ID 'lMasis, 1991
ESPLANADE GARDEN:
Development of the main garden
on CB-2
WEST GARDEN:
Development of garden
adjacent to retail and
ARE on CB-2
CULTURAL BUILDING:
Development of 50%
of the cuiltural facilities
on CB-2
DETER11INED BY SFRA:
Operation & maintenance of
gardens or cultural, to complete
remainder of gardens, cultural, or
CB-3, administrative expenses,
or the housing fund
EXHIBIT 2.4
OPERATING FLOW OF FUNDS
Source: Benson & r1aster
A Risk Management Strategy ror .. .YMG
MIT/CAID 7esis, 1991
E SPLANADE GARDEN:
Operation & M1aintenance
REIMBURSE YBGA:
For self-help-- if YBGA
needs to step in and
provide additional funds
to maintain gardens
REMAINDER OF GARDEN:
Operation & Maintenance
of the West Garden and CB-3
CULTURAL FACILITIES:
Operation & taintenance
GARDEN MAINTENANCE RESERVE:
............... 
.......
.... .................
................GSOM & C SO11::
..............................
Revenue From Particip
...............................
Payments and Leased
...... ...... ............... .......................
............................. ......................
'*'** .............................. Parcel............... s*** .......................................................... .... .... .... ...........................................
..................................................... * ................................................
............................... 0 ....................................................................... -
............
.............
............
.............
............
.............
............
...........
..........
...........
..........
...........
..........
...........
..........
CHAPTER THREE
HOW HAS THE STRATEGY WEATHERED TIME?
Today, more than six years after the signing of the
original DDA, the SFRA and O&Y are renegotiating the
financial terms for the sale and development of the office
parcels on CB-1 and EB-2. The deadlines for the construction
of the office, retail, and ARE, have repeatedly come and gone
with no tangible results. And while these sites are
currently as dormant as the national real estate industry,
those sites (on CB-2) targeted for the public improvements
are bursting with activity as preconstruction work begins for
the Performing Arts Center, the Visual Arts Center, and YBG's
centerpiece -- the 5-acre Esplanade Garden. How has the SFRA
managed to begin its public amenity improvements in advance
of the private development? Has the SFRA assumed greater
risk by doing this? Does the buckets strategy still exist,
and if so, how has it evolved over the course of negotiating
the public-private deal?
To answer these questions, this Chapter first analyzes
the current renegotiations between the SFRA and O&Y. Then it
looks back over the past six years in an attempt to
understand how the 1984 agreement and buckets strategy have
evolved. This discussion, preparation for a more detailed
study of public risk-taking in Chapter Four, should reveal
how risks are shared between public and private partners as
political, design, and financial changes continue to shape
the YBG development.
Since the signing of the 1984 DDA, ten amendments have
been passed to redefine specific rights and obligations of
each party. A chronological list of significant changes and
events can be found in Appendix C, while the more influential
changes will be reviewed and discussed throughout this
chapter.
Public Development in a Recession
On May 2, 1991, Mayor Art Agnos accepted an $11.1-
million42 check from O&Y which would insure the construction
of the public improvements on CB-2. He hailed it as the
realization of planning that began in the 1960s. "This check
assures that a decades-old dream will finally come true with
the magnificence envisioned by the Friends of the Yerba Buena
Gardens. Our generation will point to this project and say,
this is what we got done for San Francisco. It is the kind
of urban renewal we will be able to point to with pride. "43
Shortly afterwards, the SFRA made commitments to the cultural
buildings and the Esplanade Garden on CB-2 by awarding steel
contracts of $2.5 and $3 million, respectively, for the
Visual Arts Center and the Performing Arts Center. (See
Exhibits 3.1 - 3.4 for current plans and program
information.) The West Garden will be built at a later date
as its design is integral with the planned retail on CB-2.
These CB-2 public amenities (the Esplanade Garden and
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cultural facilities) are now expected to cost $62 million,
while the set value of the CB-1 office parcel is $37.8
million. 4 4
Before jumping into a detailed discussion of the current
renegotiations, it is important to understand the two
fundamental problems which have brought the parties back to
the bargaining table: (1) The construction of the project
has been delayed, and (2) in order to adequately fund the CB-
2 public improvements, the SFRA needs net proceeds from the
sale of the CB-1 office parcel greater than the price as set
by the 1984 DDA.
While construction of the Marriott Hotel (Phase 1) began
on schedule in August 1986, the other portions of the project
(Phase 2 and 3) have been delayed for a number of reasons.
In February 1986, announcement that the George R. Moscone
Convention Center would be expanded under CB-2, immediately
delayed construction of the cultural facilities and gardens
on CB-2 until the summer of 1991. By 1987, in light of the
weak market for commercial office space delayed the sale and
development of the CB-1 office (Appendix C). The details of
these significant changes will be discussed in another
section. This section and the following section will
describe what steps have been taken, and may yet be taken, to
provide the SFRA with the necessary funds to complete these
improvements.
The commencement of public amenity construction on CB-2,
the first step toward the tangible realization of public
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development, was the result of an agreement embodied in the
Eighth Amendment to the original DDA, and approved by the
SFRA, on January 30, 1991, just months before the Mayor's
statements. As in previous amendments, this one included an
extension of the date for conveying the CB-1 office parcel,
however, it differed distinctly with respect to construction
and financing priorities. Recognizing the difficulties in
current capital and real estate markets, yet aware of public
pressures to commence construction of the public amenities,
this DDA amendment scheduled construction of the public
improvements on CB-2 to begin before conveyance of the office
parcels and related obligations by YBGA. As the schedule
below shows, the developer agreed to make a series of
"deposits" totaling $35 million whose structure corresponded
to the SFRA's anticipated needs for funding of the public
improvements.
Deposit Schedule:45
Payment 1 Feb. 7, 1991 $3.6 million
Payment 2 Apr. 1, 1991 $3.1 million
Payment 3 May. 1, 1991 $9.9 million
Payment 4 Oct. 1, 1991 $9.8 million
Payment 5 Jan. 2, 1992 $8.6 million
The SFRA would retain a prior deposit of $2.8 million to
bring the total purchase price to $37.8 million. The reader
should note that this $2.8 million would later become a point
of confusion and disagreement between the two parties when
contemplating an alternate solution using public-bond
financing. YBGA would also be required to put up a $4.6-
million letter of credit in April 1991.46 With the May 1
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payment, (payment plus interest and premium) the remaining
payments would be guaranteed -- if YBGA were to default after
this payment, the SFRA could keep all of the deposits, or
tender the property and force YBGA to pay the full purchase
price.
pu/
pu
rnnsit solution, the parties had been
(f empt bond-financing arrangement,
made it infeasible. Tax-exempt
ause it could potentially provide
proceeds than the cash payments,
of the developers' payment stream
being less than the $37.8-million
posit approach, designed to be
acceptable financing arrangement.
f1V04ol U-.AtX . necessary cash flow for the public
rificing the bond-financing option
amount of funds available to the
ave the SFRA the security of having
not just a promise of financing,
6P 0:d with ordering materials and meet
their construcL..±a. ale.
The public-private partnership is now approaching a fork
in the road as illustrated in Exhibit 3.5. As prescribed by
the amendment, prior to October 1, 1991, the SFRA and YBGA
would continue to work together to structure a tax-exempt
bond issue that would provide the Agency with $48 million in
net proceeds to substantially fund the construction of its
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improvements. This financing would subject the CB-1 office
parcel to a special property tax-increment (a Mello-Roos bond
to be described in the next section) which the SFRA would use
to pay off the bonds over time. The deposit solution
essentially gave YBGA the option of finding alternative
financing while continuing its deposits. If bond-financing
is arranged before October 1, 1991, then the deposits will be
returned to the Developer. It is important to note, however,
that while the original DDA called for YBGA to finance the
purchase of the CB-1 office parcel with a minimum of 20%
equity, the Agency is now helping the developer to finance
the purchase with 100% public bond-financing. This increased
risk exposure for the SFRA, should YBGA default, will be
discussed in Chapter Four.
Because land sale proceeds will also be required to
develop the public amenities on CB-3 at a later, undetermined
date, YBGA and the Agency will continue to negotiate the
terms for conveying the EB-2 office parcels. YBGA's right to
purchase these parcels, however, is now dependent on the SFRA
receiving net proceeds from the sale of CB-1 of no less than
$48 million, 4 7 either from a bond issue or by cash payments by
YBGA before October 1, 1991 (Exhibit 3.5). YBGA would also
be required to make a series of construction cost premiums
and interest payments to compensate for the delays in
conveyance and construction. 48
The Relationship Intact.. .So Far
In the current negotiations, one of the SFRA's key
objectives is to obtain a premium, or "bump", on the sale of
the CB-1 office parcel. The Agency needs these additional
funds to meet its construction commitments for the CB-2
public improvements. To once again interlock the parties
interests, the SFRA has tied YBGA's rights to develop EB-2 to
the realization of a bump by October 1, 1991. This section
will discuss the SFRA's attempts to provide public financing
for the conveyance of CB-1 to YBGA, and, should these
attempts fail, their plan to substantially finance the public
amenities with the deposit payments and tax-increment
financing, without O&Y.
Both parties first attempted to achieve this bump by
using a Mello-Roos bond issue (see Appendix D). This is a
tax-exempt financing method by which municipal agencies in
California can issue tax-exempt bonds secured by a property
tax lien to finance public facilities. 4 9 A specific area is
designated as a Mello-Roos district and a special district-
wide tax is assessed annually in an amount necessary to pay
debt service on the bonds. This special tax becomes a lien
on the property. The plan for YBG was to issue a senior
piece of debt for up to $40 million and a subordinate piece
of debt, to be purchased by O&Y, for up to $12 million. 5 0
After subtracting $4 million to cover the costs of bond
issuance, the SFRA anticipated net receipts of approximately
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$48 million. The "Mello-Roos" tax assessment on CB-1, paid
by YBGA, would pay off the bonds.
This plan, however, ran into problems. While the SFRA
agreed to accept a bump of $8.2 million, given the current
conditions of the capital markets, YBGA could only produce a
bump of $5.4 million, without paying more than the negotiated
price for the land. The difference in these figures, $2.8
million, turned out to be the prior deposit that was noted in
the last section. If this seems confusing, it was. The SFRA
was assuming that the $5.4 million would be in addition to
the $2.8 million, but O&Y thought otherwise. 5 1  Once the
parties understood each other's position, there was no deal. 52
The SFRA Commission, a varied group of seven
professionals and community activists appointed by the Mayor,
would not accept the Mello-Roos financing plan for two
reasons. First, it felt the YBGA offer was not sufficient to
compensate the Agency for its exposure to greater financial
risk. Second, it was unwilling to risk rising interest rates
for the two months between signing the agreement and
marketing the bonds. The commission was unwilling to approve
the plan because it was concerned that, if YBGA defaulted,
the SFRA would have been responsible for payment of $3.3
million of Mello-Roos taxes per year. 53  By June 1991, the
opportunity to issue Mello-Roos bonds, in time to meet the
City Assessor's annual deadline for establishing tax-
assessment districts, had passed.54
As a result, the deal was in limbo, stuck between the
unworkable previous arrangement and an uncertain future.
Currently, two alternate forms of public financing are being
considered. First, in anticipation that the Mello-Roos
approach might not be successful, in early 1991 the Agency
obtained approval to issue $20 million of tax-increment
bonds. The SFRA would use these in addition to the deposits
if the deadline was not met (O&Y would continue deposits and
lose office rights to EB-2). The proceeds from this issue
were intended to bridge the gap between the capital funding
needs and the later sale of EB-2.
Second, in yet another attempt to work with O&Y to
finance its purchase of the CB-1 office site, the SFRA
applied to the Commission for approval of a General
Obligation Bond which would have provided the Agency with net
proceeds of approximately $48 million. Robert T. Gamble,
Deputy Executive Director of Finance for the SFRA, saw this
as a possible way for the SFRA to get its bump and for YBGA
to meet its October 1 deadline (Exhibit 3.5) . "A SFRA
General Obligation Bond would be supported by cash, a letter
of credit, or bond insurance [provided by YBGA]. The SFRA
would essentially be acting as a bank. Since we would not
allow the Mello-Roos [bond issue] to default, we might as
well put our own credit on the line. If the issue could be
insured, we could get a AAA rating and increase the spread to
create a higher bump -- maybe $11.35-million." 55
It was generally understood that this General Obligation
bond would have presented no greater financial risk than a
Mello-Roos Bond because the SFRA would not have permitted
default on either bond. However, because the General
Obligation bonds would be a direct obligation of the Agency,
the perception of greater risk doomed the proposal. 5 6 The
General Obligation bond proposal appeared to present the
Agency with the desired funds along with acceptable financial
risk. By turning it down, however, the Agency is clearly
attempting to manage the perceived risk viewed by the public.
The issue remains unsettled, with the parties still at work
on an acceptable General Obligation Bond agreement.
As illustrated in Exhibit 3.5, if they do not reach
agreement on a bond financing by October 1 1991, YBGA will
complete its series of deposits for $35 million, but lose its
right to purchase the EB-2 parcels for office use. In that
event, Gamble believes the SFRA would then likely issue a
tax-increment bond for up to $20 million to aid its funding
for capital improvements: "In a sense we're creating our own
bridge financing". The public improvements on CB-2 are
expected to cost approximately $62 million5 7 and would be
funded from the following sources: 58
Sale of CB-1 office parcel5 9  $35.0 million
Renegotiated Marriott lease6 o $10.0 million
Tax Increment Bond Proceeds $16.6 million
Total $61.6 million
The relationship between the SFRA and YBGA appears to be
at yet another fork in the road, but the SFRA is finally
moving toward realization of its public development
objectives -- despite the uncertain timing of private
commercial development. On May 2, 1991, if O&Y had elected
not to make the deposit payment which guaranteed the purchase
of CB-1, YBG and its public amenities would have suffered yet
another setback, perhaps delaying construction for several
more years. And, the SFRA stepped forward and accepted much
of the risk from which it had spent the better part of a
decade actively attempting to shelter itself.
While it appears that they will raise the still-needed
funds through one of the public financing sources described
above, have they protected their risks? Or have they gotten
just enough money to get themselves into "trouble"? While it
is likely that the public amenities on CB-2 will be completed
and stand as a cultural success and urban landmark for
generations to come, there appears to be little protection
for the public exposure to financial risk.
With the October 1 deadline drawing nearer, each side
seems to feel that this could be the final fork in the road.
Although deadlines have repeatedly been extended in the past,
this one appears to be more concrete, for both financial and
political reasons. First, the SFRA has set the construction
of the public amenities into motion and will soon need the
bump, either from O&Y or its own public-financing (tax-
increment) play. Second, and perhaps more important, Mayor
Art Agnos is up for re-election in November. Without a
tangible resolution of this issue, he would have a difficult
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time explaining to the voters why O&Y was granted an
extension and why the city and the SFRA could not stand firm
on their positions. Before evaluating these uncertainties,
it is important to understand the other changes that have
taken place since the original DDA.
Programmatic Changes -- Or Policy Changes?
The YBG development has undergone a variety of changes
since the 1984 DDA (Exhibits 3.1 - 3.4). These changes, both
internal and external, have shaped the evolution of the
agreement to date. A chronological list of significant
events can be found in Appendix C, while the more influential
changes will also be reviewed in this section.
The most significant programmatic change, ironically,
will have very little visual impact on the completed project:
The City of San Francisco, in need of more space for the
Moscone Convention Center, reached an agreement in 1986 to
expand underground and beneath the cultural buildings and the
gardens on CB-2. 61 (The 330,000-square-foot expansion will
have an above-ground lobby at Howard Street and connect with
the existing Convention Center under Howard Street.) As a
result, construction of the public amenities had to be
delayed until the summer of 1991. Also, the change displaced
the planned 1,250 parking spaces YBGA was obligated to
build, 62 likely a great financial relief for the developer.
To partially compensate for the loss of parking spaces, the
City parking authority will include an additional 850 spaces
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in its planned expansion of the Fifth and Mission parking
garage. Despite these changes in responsibility, there is no
legal agreement or exchange of funds between the YBGA
Partnership and the Parking Authority.
A second set of changes involved the uses for EB-2, now
divided into three parcels: EB-2a, EB-2b, and EB-2c. EB-2a
is still targeted as the site of a 500,000-square-foot office
building. In July 1988, after considerable negotiations with
the SFRA and O&Y, the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art
(SFMOMA) announced its plans to build a 200,000-square-foot
"world-class museum" on EB-2b. The parcel will be purchased
from the SFRA for a nominal sum of $1, while the construction
and operation of the museum will be funded entirely by
private donations.
As of September 1990, in the single largest capital
campaign for an American museum, SFMOMA had raised funds in
excess of the $60-million construction cost. (Most of the
pledges have come from the SFMOMA's Board of Trustees. 6 3 )
Construction is scheduled to begin in early 1992 with a grand
opening planned for early 1995.64 Flanked by the proposed
office towers on either side and directly across from the two
recently redesigned cultural buildings, the SFMOMA will
anchor a new, and architecturally rich, cultural and business
corridor in San Francisco. These five buildings have been
designed by a variety of internationally acclaimed
architects. Mayor Agnos, commenting on the museum and
cultural center, compared it to Lincoln Center in New York. 65
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From the perspective of the SFRA-YBGA partnership, the
presence of the Museum will create a synergy between the
cultural facilities on CB-2 and the EB-2 block, thereby
increasing the value of the EB-2a and EB-2c sites. It will
also solidify the image of YBG as a significant multi-
cultural complex.
While these efforts and images are very impressive,
whether they properly represent the City's original intent to
create a cultural center for, and representing, San
Francisco's diverse ethnic and social population is arguable.
Many special interest groups feel that the new complex will
cater to a select few of elite citizens and tourists. The
recent change in the focus of the Yerba Buena Gardens
Cultural Center (YBGCC), a nonprofit organization formed to
manage the facilities, illustrates this concern. The YBGCC
role has changed from being a renter to a presenter." This
move was made in order to produce shows and exhibitions which
would draw the crowds and revenues deemed necessary to meet
the operating budget. But, this fundamental change in policy
has spread concerns that City's initial mission, to provide a
forum for San Francisco's multi-cultural artists and
neighborhood theater groups, will not be realized.67
Residential uses also fell victim to changing economic
conditions. The EB-2c parcel, previously designated for
residential use, may now accommodate a 300,000-square-foot
office building under the conditions of the Eighth Amendment.
The SFRA originally guaranteed that this building, like the
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proposed office buildings on CB-1 and EB-2a, would be exempt
from certain city guidelines. To squelch public criticism,
O&Y agreed that this one would be included in the City's
quota on annual office construction (475,000 square feet per
year) as prescribed by the Downtown Master Plan, Proposition
M. This office building would also be subject to the City's
strict design guidelines and approval process. 68
The only other proposed residential use in YBG has also
been eliminated. In 1988, the Seventh Amendment included a
provision to alter the use of what was originally the CB-1
residential parcel. Now, it may be leased to YBGA for the
development of a 55,000-square-foot sports club, which is to
be completed with the CB-1 office building. 69 These changes
removing residential components from the program run contrary
to the concerns of various special interest groups and the
SFRA's original desire as reflected in its RFQ. They also
conflict with the city's housing master plan which calls for
reserving all possible new sites for residential use. In
response to criticism from the Planning Commission, SFRA
Executive Director Edward Helfeld said: "Offices are the
engine that gets us the money. "7 0 It appears that the higher
tax revenues as well as the higher lease and land sale
proceeds associated with these commercial uses were too
compelling for the City and the SFRA to ignore, fiscally
pressed as they are to deliver the public amenities.
Phasing Shifts to Meet Changing Demand
The parcelization of the property structured in the 1984
DDA is still clearly evident. However, specific obligations
(or "ties") with respect to options or phases have been
added, altered, or are still being renegotiated. The Seventh
Amendment called for the existing retail and ARE lease to be
split into two separate leases. The first lease was for the
retail on CB-1, and the second, for the retail and ARE on CB-
2 and CB-3. Since that time, however, in the Memorandum Of
Understanding of June 1990, YBGA relinquished all rights to
develop retail and ARE on CB-3. This was done in
anticipation of future public financing to construct these
improvements. The SFRA is now responsible for constructing
and soliciting operators for these facilities.
Although the Marriott hotel uses on CB-1 and CB-2,
(Phase 1), have been completed and Marriott continues as
operator of the hotel, the development relationship between
the Marriott Corporation and O&Y was severed in the spring of
1991. This separation was anticipated and presents no
significant changes to the DDA nor does it threaten the hotel
bucket funding operations of the public amenities. In an
attempt to market the hotel for a sale, the Marriott
Corporation renegotiated its lease with the SFRA, adding
clauses required by the mortgage lender, and in return for
the potential economic benefit afforded by this
renegotiation, Marriott agreed to pay $10 million to the
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SFRA.7 1 In the event of a sale of its leasehold rights,
Marriott would likely continue to manage and operate the
hotel.
O&Y is now obligated to purchase and lease the CB-1
parcels and on them to develop a sports club, retail
facilities and an office building. The option to purchase
the EB-2a and EB-2c office parcels depends on O&Y's decisions
targeted at the October 1, 1991 deadline described
previously; the right to build out the sites further depends
on O&Y developing the retail and ARE uses on CB-2.
As has been true all along, the office buildings still
drive the deal. Despite the current real estate slump and
recession, O&Y still has a long-term interest in securing a
significant cluster of commercial office buildings in San
Francisco, and YBG still offers the best opportunity for
achieving this goal. 72  The SFRA, by tieing its development
objectives to O&Y's rights to the office parcels, is seeking
its goal of leveraging the development value of CB-1 to fund
the public amenities on CB-2. This method has resulted in
O&Y paying at least $35 million -- perhaps several years in
advance of construction -- for the CB-1 office parcel. It is
possible that they may also decide to pay in advance for the
EB-2 parcels. Today, the proposed construction dates are as
follows:73
Parcel Target Date Outside Date
CB-1 Jul. 1993 Jul. 1995
EB-2a Dec. 1994 Dec. 1998
EB-2c Dec. 1996 Dec. 1999
The Buckets Survive
The bucket strategy, as described in Chapter 2, is still
intact. The money has begun to flow into both the Capital
Account (approximately $24 million) and the Special Accounts
(GSOM & CSOM -- approximately $6 million) for the
construction and continued operation of the public amenities
on CB-2.
At one point it was anticipated that the SFRA would need
to contribute $24 million of its own funds for capital
improvements. 74 However, the advance payments, as set forth
in the Eighth Amendment, guarantee that proceeds from the
sale of CB-1 are being placed into the Capital Account. The
SFRA maintains that the bump (with O&Y before October 1, 1991
deadline) or tax-increment bonds (without O&Y after the
deadline) will provide additional and timely funding to
complete the gardens and both cultural buildings, not just
the gardens and 50% of cultural as anticipated in the
original DDA in 1984. Since the tax-increment bonds would be
secured by future land sales anticipated within the next few
years, the capital funding bucket still appears intact.
The current flow of funds from the CB-1 hotel lease
(approximately $3 million), along with O&Y's 20% contribution
to the GSOM, will, the SFRA believes, be sufficient to fund
the GSOM and CSOM accounts as originally anticipated. While
the representatives of the cultural facilities (YBGCC) have
argued that they, and not the Gardens, should be the first
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bucket in the flow of operating funds, the bucket strategy
and its list of priorities remains substantially7 5 intact and
unchanged (Exhibit 2.3 and 2.4) . As the program and the
needs of the various operators continue to become clearer, a
change to the operating flow of funds, while conceivable,
could only be achieved through an amendment to the original
DDA. This is unlikely, though, since currently there are no
other financial means to support the Gardens. The bucket
strategy not only dictated the use of specific funds, it
continues to provide a workable framework to channel (and
reorganize if needed) the allocation of funds as the YBG
project continues to evolve.
The Public Takes on More Risk
The terms of the public-private agreement formalized in
the original DDA defined the risk exposure of each party in
broad terms through site-specific obligations. As political,
physical, and economic changes redefined the risks involved
in the YBG development, the deal had to be renegotiated to
mitigate risks that threatened to deep-six the project. Ever
subject to events beyond its control, no matter how tightly
crafted a DDA, the development of YBG has been caught in the
midst of a historic glut of office space, a credit crunch, a
national recession, and a private partner who feels the pinch
of all of these. O&Y currently has its hands full with an
even larger project, Canary Wharf in London, England, the
first phase of which (9 buildings totaling 4.5-million square
78
feet) is scheduled for occupancy in late 1991-92. (Upon
completion, the 71-acre development will feature 24 buildings
and 12-million square feet of space with an estimated price
tag of $6.5 billion. 76 )
To move the YBG project forward, the SFRA has reversed
its construction priorities and commenced the construction of
the public amenities -- taking additional risk in the
process. Specifically, which risks have increased and which
risks have been reduced? Are the public and private parties
equally sharing the burden of current risks, or has the SFRA
taken on a greater share? Chapter 4 analyzes these risks in
greater detail and evaluates the risk-taking strategy of the
SFRA as a public agency. An analysis of the risks involved
in the 1984 DDA and the changes apparent in the current
agreement reveals how the SFRA manages its risks as a public
deal-maker.
EXHIBIT 3.1
YBG 1991 AXONOMETRIC
YERBA BUENA GARDENS
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Source: Olympia & York
EXHIBIT 3.2
YBG 1991 SITE PLAN
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Source: San Francisco Redevelopment Agency
EXHIBIT 3.3
YBG 1991 Fact Sheet
-Yerba-Buena-Gardens "Fact.Sheet"
PROGRAM RESPONSIBLE PARTY
C1: 750,000 sq. ft. office building YBG Associates
1,500 room convention hotel YBG Associates
Up to 100,000 sq. ft retail located in:
Hotel
Office Building
Retail Galleria
55,000 sq. ft. to be determined YBG Associates
(SFRA to maket site)
550 underground parking spaces YBG Associates
Rehabilitation of Jessie Street Substation SF Museum of Modern Art
2 acres open space: Market Street Forecourt YBG Associates
St. Patrick's Square
CE:2: 30,000 sq. ft retail on gardens YBG Associates
45,000 sq. ft Restaurant/Entertainment YBG Associates
48,000 sq. ft. Cinemas
75,000 sq. ft. Cultural Facilities: SF Redevelopment Agency
Theater - 750 seats
Visual Arts Center:
gallery/exhibit space of 9,500 sq. ft.
video/film facility - 100 seats
fonim/festival space 9,000 sq. ft.
administration/box office - 6,000 sq. ft
general services (incl. bookstore and cafe) - 4,750 sq. ft
Hotel meeting rooms underground - 130,000 sq. ft YBG Associates
Moscone Convention Center Expansion - 330,000 sq.ft. City
(underground exhibit space and meeting rooms)
Pedestrian bridge from 5th and Mission Garage SF Redevelopment Agency
200-300 parking spaces YBG Associates
(subject to design constraints)
6 acres open space SF Redevelopment Agency
CD:1: 25,000 sq. ft ice rink (w/food service) SF Redevelopment Agency
20,000 sq. ft. Children's Museum SF Redevelopment Agency
10,600 sq. ft. Carousel and Museum SF Redevelopment
10,000 sq. ft. Child Care SF Redevelopment Agency
Pedestrian bridge from CB-2 SF Redevelopment Agency
110,000 sq. ft. Moscone Convention Center meeting rooms City
ED:2: 500,000 sq. ft office building YBG Associates
300,000 sq. ft office building YBG Associates
Incidental Retail - 10,000 sq. ft. YBG Associates
200,000 sq. ft. Museum of Modern Art SF Museum of Modern Art
05191
Source: San Francisco Redevelopment Agency
EXHIBIT 3.4
YBG PROGRAM COMPARISON
I. OFFICE
CB-1
EB-2a
EB-2c
Sub Total
II. RESIDENTIAL
CB-1
EB-2c
Sub Total
III. RETAIL (1991)
CB-1 (w/ sports)
CB-2 (w/ cinemas)
CB-3
EB-2 (incidental)
Sub Total
IV. ARE
CB-2
Ice Rink
Child Museum
Child Care
CB-3
Ice Rink
Child Museum
Child Care
Sub total
V. CULTURAL
CB-2 YBGCC
EB-2 SFMOMA
Sub Total
VI. PARKING
CB-1
CB-2
EB-2
5th & Mission Gar
Sub Total
1984 Program
750,000 sf
500,000 sf
0 sf
1,250,000 sf
40 units
300-500 units
340-540 units
90,000 sf
82,000 sf
11,000 sf
0 sf
183,000 sf
30,000 sf
40,000 sf
0 sf
0 sf
0 sf
0 sf
70,000 sf
100,000 sf
0 sf
100,000 sf
450 spaces
1,250 spaces
400-600 spaces
0 spaces
2,100-2,300 spaces
1991 Program
750,000 sf
500,000 sf
300,000 sf
1,550,000 sf
0 units
0 units
0 units
155,000 sf
123,000 sf
0 sf
10,000 Sf
288,000 sf
0 sf
0 sf
0 sf
25,000 sf
30,600 sf
10,000 sf
75,000 sf
101,800 sf
200,000 sf
303,800 sf
550 spaces
200-300 spaces
700-900 spaces
850 spaces
2,300-2,700 spaces
Source: Benson & Flaster, A Risk Management Strategy For.. .YBG
MIT/CRED Thesis, 1991
EXHIBIT 3.5
THE FINAL FORK IN THE ROAD
O&Y
AND FUTURE
PAYMENTS TO
DEVELOPMENT
THE SFRA
RIGHTS -
Payment Payment Payment
Feb 7, Apr 1, May 1,
1991 1991 1991
Source: Benson & Flaster
A Risk Management Strategy For.. .YBG
MIT/CRED Thesis, 1991
Payment
Oct 1,
1991
Bond Issued or
Early Payments
to satisfy the
SFRA before
Oct 1, 1991
CB-1 Office
Conveyed
Payment
Jan 2,
1992
CB-1
Office
Conveyed
Right to Buy
EB-2a & EB-2c
Office Parcels
Tied to
Retail & ARE
on CB-2
Can Still
Buy EB-2c
For
Residential
Development
Only
1991
CHAPTER FOUR
THE SFRA AS AN ENTREPRENEUR
In a public-private joint venture as ambitious and
complicated as YBG, the public agency acting on behalf of the
city needs the power and the ability to act in the public's
best interest in shaping -- and reshaping -- the deal with
its private partner. This necessarily involves a behavioral
flexibility not normally associated with the rigid
bureaucratic patterns of public-sector behavior. It also
requires that the public developer willingly assume real
estate risks that are typically considered the responsibility
of profit-oriented private developers. The SFRA will be
judged successful if it can balance the new entrepreneurial
behavior with its traditional responsibility for
accountability to the public.
This chapter analyzes the risks associated with the
project's development, partnership, and finance, and how
these risks have been managed, assumed or reduced by the
SFRA. In particular, it seeks to evaluate how elements of
the phasing/buckets strategy have served as risk-management
tools. The first section discusses the entrepreneurial
behavior of the SFRA; the next four sections interpret the
behavior of the SFRA and the results of extended negotiations
with the developer which changed the SFRA's risk exposure.
Finally, the strategy is examined from a more general
perspective of risk management. This last section seeks to
draw out principles that might be applicable to other public
agencies implementing development projects in a public-
private partnership environment.
The reader should refer to Exhibit 4.1 for a brief
analysis of how the phasing/buckets strategy helped the SFRA
manage real estate development risks as anticipated in the
1984 agreement. Exhibit 4.2 illustrates, within the
framework of the strategy, how the SFRA managed, eliminated
or assumed additional risk through the continuing
negotiations.
Entrepreneurial Behavior Shapes the Strategy
Although the SFRA has retained the phasing and buckets
strategy, both project-specific and external changes between
the years of the initial agreement and the current deal have
caused it to assume more risk in some areas while shedding
risks in other areas. In implementing the strategy, the
SFRA's goals have been to legally commit O&Y to fulfill its
obligations toward YBG and to establish strong bargaining
positions for details that would be negotiated at a later
date. Built into the idea that the partnership would be a
very long-term relationship, the SFRA also anticipated that
inevitable changes would require strong and consistent
bargaining power to protect its broader interests.
In negotiating the 1984 DDA, the Agency agreed to assume
full development risk for construction of the public
facilities and gardens in exchange for sales proceeds from
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the office sites to fund their construction. Long-term lease
revenues received from the Marriott hotel, ARE and retail
sites, and participations in the office revenues were
intended to generate public operating funds. Assuming that
the project is successful, the reversion after 60 years77 of
the leased land and improvements and the revenues earned from
the leases and participations represent long-term benefits to
future generations of San Francisco residents.
In the short run, the Agency has taken on the
responsibility for organizing and managing the construction
of the cultural facilities, as well as the public gardens on
CB-2 and CB-3. In negotiations since 1984, the Agency also
agreed to construct the ARE facilities on CB-3, partly in
order to finance the construction of these improvements
through a public-bond financing vehicle, if necessary. While
public agencies typically take responsibility for
construction of public amenities such as parks and recreation
facilities and fund these amenities through publicly issued
tax-exempt bond issues, the SFRA has undertaken the
construction and funding of the YBG amenities in an atypical
fashion: The public amenities are both directly physically
and financially linked to private commercial development, an
entrepreneurial and risky approach for a public developer.
The keystone of the phasing strategy was to time the
availability of proceeds from the sale of land to match the
SFRA's funding needs for constructing the public facilities.
While the phasing strategy is still being used to tie O&Y to
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the deal, the flow and amount of the funds available to
finance the SFRA's construction activities do not match the
Agency's current economic needs.
The Agency recently decided to proceed with its intended
1991 construction start date, despite the reluctance of O&Y
to proceed with construction of the private improvements. In
doing so, it has bowed to the community pressures to see some
tangible benefits and the City's desires to have the gardens
and cultural facilities completed for the opening of the
Moscone Convention Center expansion. By adjusting its
construction priorities, but not abandoning its goal to
finance the public amenity construction with the proceeds
from land sales, the Agency is exposing itself to a short-
term gap in construction funding. More importantly, it is
also increasing its exposure to a long-term capital funding
gap.
Its efforts to create bridge financing to fill the
$16.6-million gap between its capital fund balance (after
receipt of the CB-1 sale proceeds) and the CB-2 public
amenity funding requirements 78 indicate the SFRA's recognition
of this timing risk. Additionally, construction funding for
the total projected $97-million public amenity cost 7 9 is
dependent on both inflation adjustments to the EB-2 site
prices and on interest earned on the Agency account. 80  By
proceeding with its schedule, the SFRA is increasing the risk
that the capital fund bucket will not be full enough to meet
its construction needs.
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From a longer term perspective, if construction costs
for the total public amenity package (on CB-2 and CB-3)
escalate above the actual proceeds from the sale of the
office parcels (on CB-1 and EB-2) and any additional tax
increment financing, the SFRA may be pressured to sell other
available sites in the project area to cover the costs.
Although the SFRA has always intended to use its land in the
Yerba Buena Center district to fund the public amenities, and
it believes that there is sufficient value in other parcels
to cover any- additional cost, 81 pressure to sell the sites
might not result in a reasonable sale price. Additionally, a
"fire sale" might not result in the most advantageous use
mix, since some uses have higher economic value than others.
This, in a sense, is the well-known attribute of illiquidity
associated with real property ownership -- only viewed from a
public-sector perspective.
Politically, the project is currently being supported by
Mayor Agnos, 82 who is assisting the SFRA in obtaining tax
increment financing to bridge the anticipated capital funding
gap. Presumably, the City would also support the SFRA in
creating bridge financing to fill any gap between future
capital funding requirements and the timing of other YBC land
sales, actions which would avoid the public perception that
the Agency was giving away the land at too low a price. In
the current climate, though, since the steel for the cultural
facilities has already been ordered and cultural facility
management issues are currently being discussed with citizen
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groups, the political implications of development risk seem
*to be moot: Once the ball gets rolling, it's hard to stop.
One serious political risk being faced by the SFRA,
however, is the mayoral election in November 1991 in which
Mayor Agnos faces some strong challengers. Alarmingly close
to the October l, 1991 deadline (which could either result in
a live deal with delayed private improvement construction
dates or a severance of additional ties with O&Y), the
impending election and its results could have drastic
implications for the SFRA's continued ability to behave
entrepreneurially in the YBG deal. First, it makes the
October 1 deadline a much more "real" deadline than previous
deadlines since Mayor Agnos would get bad press if the City
and SFRA did not stand firm in their position. Second, by
already committing itself to the public-amenity construction,
the SFRA may have reduced the its bargaining power with
regard to the October deadline because of economic pressure
to fill the capital funding bucket.
Betting on a Private Developer Partner
In any public-private joint venture, the public agency
takes on risks associated with the particular party or
parties with which it becomes a partner. In selecting the
team of O&Y/Marriott as the single master developer for
design and construction of the private improvements, the SFRA
limited the number of parties with whom it would have to
continue to negotiate. Yet, it also put all of its eggs in
one .basket.
While the Agency made its initial selection from among
several highly qualified groups, the O&Y/Marriott team
brought with them an international prominence, a reputation
for financial stability, and a tentative agreement with the
Rouse Company to manage the YBG retail operations. The team
also demonstrated an understanding of the quality of the
project and the willingness to be flexible in the long-term
relationship. Since the SFRA has had an image of YBG as a
world-class development from the start, the experience,
reputation, sensitivity, and "deep pockets" combination of
the O&Y/Marriott team was especially difficult to resist (or
for the other competitors to beat).
The SFRA recognized that O&Y was the linchpin to the
team and pursued a strategy aimed at tieing the developer,
through financial incentives and commitments, to working with
the SFRA for the long-term. 83 With this in mind, the Agency's
negotiators built several mechanisms into the 1984 DDA to
protect the SFRA from the risk that the selected team would
default on its obligations, either because it had already
gotten the prizes in the YBG deal or because its enormous
financial commitments in other projects (such as Canary Wharf
in London) might prevent it from fulfilling its YBG
commitments in a timely manner.
Mechanisms to Mitigate Default Risk: First, the
SFRA structured some land transactions as leases and some as
sales with phased conveyances occurring over an initial 4-
year schedule. In doing so, the Agency tried to match cash
proceeds necessary to pay for construction of the public
amenities and cash requirements for maintenance and
operations. Since the developer's interest in entering into
the public-private agreement in the first place was to
establish a substantial long-term market position in the San
Francisco office market, the SFRA recognized that the
schedule might stretch over a longer period. By implementing
the phasing structure, the Agency attempted to control the
tension between its need for timely realization of land sales
proceeds and O&Y's long-term commercial interest in the
speculative development of the properties.
Second, perhaps the strongest motivation for O&Y to
remain in the deal and to work with the SFRA to complete the
project has been the SFRA's trump card -- the office parcels
on EB-2 slated for future development. Primarily an office
developer, O&Y has shown its colors by its reluctance to
build and operate the retail on CB-2 and by its relief
regarding the elimination of its responsibility to construct
underground parking on the site of the Moscone expansion. 8 4
Further relief has come from the removal of its housing
responsibility on CB-1.
Since O&Y is now substantially obligated to build only
what it builds best, it surely must want all three office
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sites of YBG -- a concentrated locational presence in the
severely constrained San Francisco office market. The 1.55-
million square feet to be potentially added by O&Y at YBG
represents 4.8% of the total Class "A" office space inventory
in the city as of 1990,85 and 10% of the total office space
inventory in the South of Market district. 86 Its percentage
of Class "A" space in the Yerba Buena area is significantly
higher since the area is not now a Class "A" office location.
Perhaps more notably, due to Proposition M construction
restraints, the YBG office buildings represent 26% of the
pipeline of potential new office space in the core office
area until the year 2000.87 This makes O&Y's speculative
interest very valuable indeed.
If it completes the cash payments required by the
Deposit Schedule, but does not provide the Agency's desired
bump in cash proceeds from the financing of the CB-1 sale,
O&Y preserves only an option to build a housing component on
EB-2. Thus, it is clearly in O&Y's interest to continue to
press for rights to develop the remaining two office parcels.
While the SFRA seems rigid in its position that O&Y provide
the bump by October 1, 1991 or forfeit such rights, 88 O&Y
insists that it will not pay a sales price for the CB-1
office site higher than that agreed to in the 1984 agreement
although it will work with the SFRA to create an attractive
financing package that would provide additional funds. 89
The third factor mitigating the risk that O&Y would
default is the up-front funding of option payments, as well
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as the predevelopment costs, required of the developer in the
early years of the partnership. Since the parcels are
intended to become an integrated mixed-use project, design,
legal and other expenses allocable to the later phases would
necessarily be incurred during the first phase. After 11
years of effort, O&Y has spent approximately $25 million on
such costs, exclusive of the required option payments. 90 This
money would be down a sink hole if O&Y were to default on its
obligations. On the other hand, from the developer's
perspective, these predevelopment costs might be considered
risk-mitigating option payments -- albeit costly -- which
preserve its long-term rights without actually committing to
the development.
A fourth measure mitigating the risk of default is the
set of imposed guarantees and minimum equity investments the
SFRA required of O&Y. 91 With these requirements, the Agency
intended to insure that the developer would have sufficient
cash available to fund its legal obligations, thereby
mitigating the risk that internal pressures or other
financial commitments of the development company would cause
it to default on its YBG financial obligations.
Interestingly, however, the Agency has considered eliminating
this safety feature by allowing the developer to finance 100%
of its cash advance payments for the CB-1 office site through
the Mello-Roos financing plan. This would clearly mitigate
the developer's risk, a highly unusual use for public funds.
Fifth, the SFRA restricted the ability of the developer
to assign its interests in the YBG parcels until the
improvements were completed and even then, assignment is only
permitted after Agency approval. This anti-speculative
covenant mitigates the risk that O&Y will be able to sell out
its position and leave the SFRA with an unwanted partner. It
is important because the Agency needs to protect the quality
of construction, design, and operations, as well as assure
itself of the financial ability of the developer partner to
perform its long-term obligations.
Other Factors Protecting the Agency: Despite the
financial and legal ramifications, it would not be in O&Y's
long-term corporate interest to walk away from the
possibility of developing all three office sites. Even
though the YBG development, estimated to cost $1.5 billion,
is smaller, in comparison, than the London Canary Wharf
project, O&Y's only other on-going development project
estimated to cost £4-billion (currently approximately $6.5
billion), the news of an O&Y default would cause irreparable
damage to the parent company's reputation and shake lenders'
confidence about the ability of O&Y to honor its other
commitments. In addition, the founders of the Toronto-based,
privately-held family company are known to be interested in
passing the company to the second generation and would not
want to pass on an unhealthy company. 92 While these internal
pressures might create an incentive for O&Y to reduce its
short-term development exposure, the company would be giving
up a substantial future value.
The failure of the phasing/buckets strategy to fully
protect the SFRA from default risk could come about if O&Y is
unable to successfully work with the Agency, by October 1,
1991 on financing that would give the SFRA the bump it
requires from the sale of the CB-1 office site. Then the
question becomes whether or not the two parties have enough
mutual interest to continue to work together. If not, and
O&Y decides proceed only with its right to develop the CB-1
office, what negotiation terms would be acceptable for O&Y
severing its right to construct housing on EB-2c?
Even though each side has a lot invested, both
politically and financially, at this point it is difficult to
predict the outcome. While the SFRA and O&Y have been
described by a close participant in the process as "spiders
in a jar, "93 it would be a major setback to the SFRA if it had
to begin negotiations anew with another developer. On the
other hand, the SFRA believes that putting the EB-2 office
sites up for bid might create an opportunity to realize
higher values on those parcels since they should become more
attractive when the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art and
the public amenities are completed. 94 Realistically, however,
continuation of the partnership is probably the least costly
and most opportune solution for both parties.
Sharing the Private Market Risks
In joining with a private developer partner and making
funding requirements for the public amenities dependent on
the conveyance of the private parcels, the Agency clearly
assumed the development risk of proprietary ownership. The
crux of the deal is that the SFRA believes that the long-term
value of property at YBG is significant because of its
location and the quality of public amenities being built
there. 95  Thus, the Agency's big-picture entrepreneurial
strategy is to share this risk with the developer in order to
realize higher value for the public land and create long-term
public benefits.
While some elements of the phasing/buckets strategy were
designed to mitigate some of the predevelopment and short-
term risks, the SFRA designed other elements to shift to the
private developer longer-term market risks that might effect
the value received for the land.
Pricing Publicly Owned Property: Although publicly
owned land utilized by a public-private partnership is
typically sold at a discount to induce private developers to
take risks, the SFRA has reduced substantial predevelopment
risk to its private partner by conveying the phased parcels
to the developer with all necessary approvals in place. In
turn, in the 1984 DDA, the SFRA sought fair market values for
its property, and it did so in a way that would preserve the
parcel's fair market value by the time of construction.
It attempted to solve this problem by tieing the 1984
fair market value of CB-1 to a construction-cost index that
would track inflation. By fixing the price in this manner,
the SFRA tried to limit the down-side property market risk
that the sale proceeds would not reflect fair market value
for the predetermined use at the time of conveyance. If
property values declined, but inflation persisted, the Agency
clearly would become a winner. While this general inflation
adjustment mitigated such down-side risk, it would not adjust
upward if land values increased faster or greater over time
than inflation.
Recognizing that the program of use and density of
development might change through the predevelopment process,
the parties left the price of the EB-2 sites undetermined in
the 1984 DDA. They stipulated that when the price was
negotiated, it would reflect fair market value at that time.
While they discussed including a clause to adjust the price
of CB-1 office site for any changes to the use intensity, the
SFRA and O&Y agreed such a change would trigger a
renegotiation of the base price at that later date. 9 6 Thus,
the understanding between the two was a clear sharing of the
risk associated with market conditions, with the Agency
shifting the down-side risk associated with CB-1 onto the
developer and retaining the down-side risk associated with
EB-2.
Since 1984, movement in the inflation index has upped
the price of CB-1 from $32.5 million to $37.8 million97 in
1991. Due to soft market conditions, however, it is arguable
whether the land fair market value has actually increased
during this time. Although we do not have the data to assess
comparable land prices in the YBG area, a comparative
analysis of the YBG sale prices for the CB-1 and EB-2 sites
can shed some light into the SFRA's success in protecting
itself.
Per the 1984 DDA, the land price per square foot of
gross buildable floor area on the CB-1 office site increased
from $43 in 1984 to $50 in 1991. By comparison, the 1991
negotiated land price per square foot of gross floor area for
the EB-2a office site is $4198 and for the EB-2c office site
is $35.99 Since the fair market value per buildable gross
square foot in the YBG area is lower today than it was in
1984, and the Agency is entitled to a much higher price for
CB-1 today, the SFRA seems to have successfully shifted some
of its down-side market risk to the developer on the CB-1
site. 1 0 0  From the developer's perspective, however, it
shifted the down-side risk on the EB-2 sites onto the Agency
by leaving the EB-2 prices unnegotiated in 1984.
Phasing and Use Mix to Maintain Economic Value:
The SFRA also attempted to protect the economic value of the
entire YBG redevelopment property through the development
stage by parcelizing the private land uses. It did this in
such a way that the first phase exists as independent set of
developed properties with each subsequent phase, including
those with the public amenities, integrating successfully
with the existing improvements. The physical attributes of
the project area guided this tactic. The hotel and CB-1
office sites, as the first phase and part of the second
phase, are on Market Street, a location which allows each to
operate without the synergy of the public amenities. In
fact, the Marriott is currently operating successfully on its
own, but this was made possible by the presence of the
convention center.
Since 1984, the SFRA has take on more risk by adjusted
the phasing strategy.101 Since the SFRA believes that the
cinema and restaurants will attract people to the site,
integrating the retail and ARE from the opening day of the
project with the CB-2 cultural facilities, gardens and open
spaces has been important to the Agency. Because the
obligation to build the CB-2 retail is now tied to the
purchase of the EB-2 sites and O&Y's option to purchase these
sites may expire on October 1, 1991, the SFRA may end up
without a developer for the CB-2 retail and ARE. Even if O&Y
stays in the deal, these private improvements will certainly
open for business much later than the CB-2 public amenities.
The SFRA perceives this as one of the biggest risks it
faces. 12
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Living with Local Market Conditions:
retain its rights to develop the EB-2 office sites, it may
not make economic sense to build the retail or the offices in
the time frame established by the SFRA, despite the fact that
the SFRA is plowing ahead with construction on the cultural
facilities. One reason that O&Y has delayed construction of
the CB-1 office since 1984 has been the soft San Francisco
market conditions,103 where the vacancies for Class "A" office
space currently stands at 10%.104 In revising the phasing,
the SFRA may have actually shifted additional market risk
back onto itself.
While the 1984 agreement specified dates of purchase by
O&Y and completion of the improvements on each parcel, the
agreement also allowed room for the inevitability of having
to negotiate changes. Originally, construction on the
cultural facilities and public gardens on CB-2 was supposed
to start in 1988 but was delayed until 1991 due to the City's
decision to expand the Moscone Convention Center.
Interestingly, this was probably both a political and lucky
break for the SFRA. Because of poor office market conditions
and bleak forecasts for near-term improvement, it would have
been difficult to convince O&Y to go ahead with the purchase
of the CB-1 office parcel. That would have left the SFRA
with a construction funding problem. Now, with the
completion of the Moscone expansion, the value of the other
sites may have increased.
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If O&Y does
Along with the completion of the Moscone expansion and
the Museum of Modern Art in the next few years, current
forecasts by consultants and commercial brokers anticipate a
window of opportunity in the San Francisco office market in
1995, based on a large turnover of leases and the cumulative
effect of the office-space growth restraints. 1 05 Anticipation
of these events is likely to induce O&Y to agree to construct
the CB-1 office building within the next four years.
Forecasts of a 4% to 6% vacancy rate in the financial core in
the late 1990s would signal future increases in rent levels'06
and simultaneously create an opportunity for development of
the EB-2 parcels. While the SFRA clearly shares the private
market risk with its phasing strategy, and has even taken on
more risk by revising the phases, it has probably gotten
lucky as a result of the impact of the City's restrictive
zoning policy on the timing of development opportunities in
the San Francisco property market. In any event, the SFRA is
at least aware that it needs to be sensitive to the local
market conditions in its continuing negotiation strategy.
Coping with External Market Conditions: In 1984,
it would have been difficult to anticipate the extent of the
impacts of the softening real estate market, the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, and the current banking crisis on real estate
development. Poor market conditions in real estate and a
national recession beginning in the late 1980s have seriously
affected both the ability and desire of O&Y to proceed with
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the YBG development on the initial schedule. Since the
SFRA's activities depended on the private development, the
economic downturn has delayed the construction of the public
amenities as well.
The phasing/buckets strategy could not deal specifically
with those risks of government-imposed disincentives for real
estate investment or of illiquidity in the capital markets.107
While timing delays and capital improvement funding problems
stemming from these macro-economic factors could easily have
completely derailed the project, the strategy has been both
stable and flexible enough to substantially withstand these
significant external market-driven crises. The project is
alive -- if not on schedule -- and the relationship between
the Agency and O&Y is still generating options for solving
the funding gap -- even though frustration and tension may be
exacting a toll.
While the economic and capital liquidity conditions are
still not conducive for successful large-scale office
development, the SFRA has assumed more risk by beginning to
construct the public amenities on its current schedule. O&Y
is still reluctant to proceed with development of the private
improvements despite the capital funding needs of the
project. These external risks, more so than any of the
anticipated risks, have caused a leak in the bucket strategy.
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Fiscal Success or Failure:
As a means of preserving the long-term value of the land
and improvements through reversion to the SFRA at the end of
the lease term, The Agency decided to lease rather than sell
the hotel, retail, and ARE sites . Doing so would create a
long-term revenue stream that would substantially cover the
costs for for the maintaining and operating the cultural
facilities and gardens. This too, however, meant that the
project would be dependent upon the successful implementation
of private development, beyond construction and into the
operations phase of the project.
Dependence nn Success of Component Uses: The
annual revenue from the Marriott lease, approximately $3
million, was intended to sufficiently fund the GSOM and CSOM
for approximately 10 years. As was anticipated in the 1984
DDA, the Cultural Center will be increasingly responsible for
generating revenue to make up for the future shortfall in the
CSOM account.
Of the annual revenues being generated by the Marriott,
only one-third represents the current holding rent of
$1,050,000.108 This means that two thirds of the annual
revenue comes from the Agency's share of gross room sales,
that is, it is linked to general economic conditions relating
to business and vacation travel and especially convention
visits. With pervasive business efforts to cut travel costs
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Will the Buckets Fill Up?
in the face of nationwide economic difficulties, the SFRA'
revenues from this source are directly exposed to external
market risks.
Leases for the CB-1 office, CB-2 retail, and the CB-1
sports club are anticipated to generate $310,000 annual fixed
revenue. 10 9 The ARE is not subject to a minimum fixed rent,
but the terms of its agreement (percentage rent on both
retail and ARE calculated after operating expenses, debt
service and a developer return on equity of 20%) may generate
additional annual revenues from these uses. Both O&Y and the
SFRA expect the cinema portion of the ARE to lose money
annually, and the short-term value of the percentage rent on
the retail is questionable.110 By the terms of the negotiated
agreement, the SFRA has assumed the lease-up risk and risk of
retail operating success in the retail lease revenue
structure.
By retaining participations in the net cash flow of the
privately developed office buildings, the SFRA is also
assuming some office market risk. The availability of these
funds depends in part on the development costs, the state of
the office market and on the ability of the developer or
future owner to lease and operate the buildings successfully.
Although the SFRA considers these participations worth very
little today, 1 1 they may very well be valuable for their
future contributions to the operating fund bucket.
Assuming that the CB-1 and CB-2 private improvements are
completed by 1994 to 1995, the annual revenues and projected
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operating expenses for a stabilized year are conservatively
estimated by the authors as follows:11 2
Revenues
Marriott Lease:
Fixed Revenue $1,050,000
Percentage Revenue 1,950,000
Retail Leases: Fixed Revenues
(CB-1, CB-2, CB-1 sports club) 310,000
Developer Contribution to Gardens
(20% of operating and maintenance
expense - see below) 500,000
Interest on Operating Fund"i3 83,000
Total Revenues $3,893,000
Expenses
Gardens $2,500,000
Cultural Facilities 2400,000
Total Expenses $4, 900,000
Net Income/(Loss) ($1,007,000)
The amount of money in the operating fund account to
support the cultural facilities and gardens depends on when
the private improvements and public amenities are completed.
The operating fund currently contains approximately $6
million, or two years of payments from the Marriott lease.114
Thus, the fund should be able to cover any potential losses
for the first several years. Beyond that time, the operating
fund will become increasingly dependent on the success of the
private uses.
If there are insufficient revenues available to pay
operating expenses for both the gardens and cultural
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facilities, the buckets strategy prioritizes the spending of
the funds. The gardens have the first priority on use of the
funds and the cultural facilities have the second priority.
The gardens operating expense budget is projected to rise
over the first ten years from $2.5 million to $4.0 million,
and the cultural facilities budget similarly from $2.4
million to $3.8 million. Unless the operating revenues
increase dramatically, the cultural facilities will have to
become increasingly independent to avoid calls on the SFRA or
the City to fund the deficit."i5
While the SFRA has diversified its operating risks
through the leasing of different uses and the office revenue
participations, it is still substantially dependent on the
revenues from the Marriott lease, and is likely to become
increasingly dependent over time on the project synergy in
making each component financially successful.
A Critical Mass of Cultural Facilities: By selling
the EB-2b site to the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art
(SFMOMA) for $1, the SFRA clearly hopes that the presence of
the museum on the site will help create a critical mass of
cultural attractions to insure both the financial and
political success of the YBG project. The presence of the
SFMOMA has also become critical to the political viability of
the YBG development as a whole, for without it the project
starts to look like a large office complex surrounding a
park.
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This critical mass of cultural facilities is intended to
-support the hotel, retail shops, restaurants, and cinema.
Despite the short-term probability that the retail and ARE on
CB-2 will not open in sync with the CB-2 public amenities and
Moscone expansion, the long-term prospects for success seem
hopeful, provided the SFRA can afford to construct, operate
and maintain the facilities with the standard of quality that
it intends.
The recent change in the program for the performing arts
center, from being a renter to a presenter, was promulgated
to increase the likelihood that it will be able to become
more financially independent toward the late 1990s. Citizens
are concerned that this change will defeat the original
purpose of the facility by inhibiting participation of local
performing arts groups, and create an elitist cultural mecca.
The change also entails additional operating and management
risk to the SFRA. Although the original intention of the
Cultural Center was independent operations, the SFRA might
need to contribute additional funds to maintain the integrity
of the facilities. In addition, there has been constant
public pressure stemming from a debate among future users of
CB-2 and CB-3 on the appropriateness of the operating fund
priorities. Despite this political pressure, the bucket
concept still exists, 1 16 leading to the conclusion that the
strategy is effective as a political risk management tool.
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Taking on the Role of a Banker
Perhaps one of the biggest risks the SFRA has considered
taking on since the 1984 agreement is the financial risk for
underwriting O&Y's land purchases. Neither the phasing or
the buckets strategy anticipated this active decision of the
SFRA, nor does either strategy help the SFRA to manage
financial risk.
In working with O&Y to create the Mello-Roos bond
financing plan, the SFRA was willing to adjust its
requirement that O&Y have not less than 20% equity in the
deal. The Mello-Roos plan effectively would have allowed O&Y
to finance 100% of the land purchase price for CB-1 in
exchange for the SFRA receiving a purchase price premium or
"bump" for taking on the credit risk. From the SFRA's
perspective, it was willing to take the credit risk on the
financing because if O&Y defaulted on its obligations, the
SFRA would have to foreclose on the land. The SFRA was
hoping to flatten the vicissitude in the capital market by
substituting public credit for private credit, essentially
acting like a bank because it has confidence in its real
estate collateral.117
Its willingness to assume this credit risk was tied
directly to its needs for an increase in the proceeds for the
sale of the CB-1 office parcel to fund the construction of
the CB-2 public amenities. The SFRA staff decided that it
would accept a bump of $8.2 million, but O&Y offered only
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$5.4 million. 1 8  The Commission decided that the offer was
not enough to compensate it for both the credit risk and the
capital market risk.119 Thus, the SFRA capped its financial
risk by not accepting the Mello-Roos bond finance plan.
The SFRA is obviously cognizant of its financial risks
and is willing to assume more to accomplish its construction
goals. Both the Agency staff and the Commission, however,
appear to understand that they have only a certain risk
tolerance level, since there was a clear decision not to
accept the Mello-Roos bond finance plan because the
additional financial risk was undervalued. In addition, the
SFRA anticipated potential problems with that plan and has
been working on a different approach to generate additional
construction funds through tax-increment financing, in effect
creating bridge financing to fund the CB-2 construction costs
until additional proceeds are received from the sale of the
EB-2 parcels.
The Phasing/Buckets Strategy as a 'Risk Management Tool
The phasing and buckets strategy contained in the
initial 1984 agreement effectively allowed the SFRA to manage
most of the anticipated risks of being a development partner
with a single master developer for a large and complicated
mixed-use redevelopment project. The SFRA has clearly acted
entrepreneurially by knowingly assuming specific risks and
attempting to mitigate and shift other risks inherent in the
YBG project.
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The strategic risk management tools of the SFRA in its
partnership with O&Y in the YBG redevelopment project can be
summarized as follows:
Phasing strategy elements
eParcelize to insure value of each phase and synergy of
the property as a whole;
ePut the "prizes" desired by the developer in the last
phase of the project;
-Do not explicitly assume financing responsibility for
the private components of a project;
-Time the completion of the public amenities with the
completion of the private improvements to create
synergy;
'Actively manage the politics of programmatic changes
with the City government and citizen groups;
-Restrict assignability of the development rights;
-Recognize property market and economic market
conditions to protect the value of the development;
'Require that specific plans for each phase of the
project be established up-front;
'Implement a combination of property sales and leases to
meet needs for construction funds, operating funds,
and long-term benefits to the city.
Buckets Concept for Capital Improvements Funding
'Fix prices for land sales with an escalation tied to an
index simulating inflation;
eChoose developer with financial stability and a strong
reputation;
'Require minimum equity and guarantees;
'Do not explicitly assume financing responsibility for
the private components of a project;
eRestrict assignability of developer rights;
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*Actively manage the politics of programmatic changes
with the City government and citizen groups.
Buckets Concept for Operations Funding
eDiversify revenue sources;
-Require most significant revenue source to be completed
early;
eEstablish funding priorities;
'Recognize that construction delays can affect level
and/or timing of the revenue stream;
*Recognize that structure of lease revenues and
participations can significantly affect revenues
generated;
eRecognize that regional and national economy may impact
the success of use components;
-Reduce dependence on developer by tieing revenues to
property performance if agency has control mechanisms
to manage property to maintain and enhance
performance;
eRequire consent of agency for developer to sell or
assign management contracts and leases;
'Establish the obligations of the agency to cover
operating deficits;
'Actively manage the politics of operating priorities
with the City government and citizen groups.
By implementing these elements of the phasing and
buckets strategy and by maintaining the framework of the
strategy throughout the negotiated evolution of the deal, the
SFRA has managed its development, partnership, market,
operating, and financial risks with ingenuity and
sophistication. Over the long and complicated life of the
project, however, the SFRA has also knowingly and
purposefully assumed more risk in order to accomplish goals
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that are independent of the real estate market discipline
under which the project must operate in the long term. The
difficulties inherent in a public-private partnership in this
type of setting are discussed in Chapter Five.
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EXHIBIT 4.1
RISK MANAGEHENT STRATEGY IN THE 1984 DDA
RISKS
ASSUMED/MITIGATED/ DEVELOPMENT RIGUTS - LAND PURCHASE AND PUBLIC FACILITY OPERATION AND
SBIFTED/ELIMINATED CONSTRUCTION PRASING STRATEGY PUBLIC AMENITY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING - MAINTENANCE FUNDING - BUCKET STRATEGY
BY SFRA STRATEGY BUCKET STRATEGY
External Market Mitigated risk by flexibility on -Shifted down-side risk to privated Assumed risk of interest rates on
Risks developer purchase and construction dates developer by fixing land purchase price on operating fund
Interest Rates CD-i with inflation escalation
Inflation -Shifted risk to private developer by not -Assumed risk through structure of lease
Capital Market explicitly assuming any financing Mitigated risk by minimum developer equity revenues and participations# revenues are
Liquidity responsibility for developer land purchase requirements (201) subject to external risk of each use
(Availability)
Tax Policy 
-Mitigated risk by choice of developer with
Regional Economy "deep pockets"
-Assumed risk of interest rates on capital
fund
Project Risk.
Development Risk
Construction -Shifted risk to private developer by -Eliminated risk of construction cost -Assumed some risk of cost increases on
Cost selling and leasing parcels to developer to increases of private improvements on sold private improvements (due to returns on
construct the private improvements and leased parcels cash flow after debt service and developer
returns)
-Mitigated risk by constructing public -Assumed risk of increases in the public
amenities over time in phases as funding amenity construction cost
became available from land sales
-Assumed risk that YBG land sales proceeds
may not be enough to cover the cost of the
desired quality of the public amenities
Construction -Mitigated risk by establishing each phase -Assumed timing risk on the public -Assumed risk of construction delays on
Timing with a workable synergy to attract people. amenities private improvements since revenues can
only be generated after the private
-Mitigated risk by timing completion of -Assumed risk that developer would try to improvements are completed
private improvements with public amenity delay land purchase beyond desired date. of
construction priorities public amenity construction
Political -Assumed risk of program ch'anges through -Assumed risk of additional political -Mitigated risk by legally establishing
potential of additional public amenity pressure if developer delays its purchase funding priorities for gardens cultural
construction cost and delays, and from of CD-i office site and construction of the facilities
developer purchase and construction delays private improvements beyond scheduled
due to market conditions construction of puhlic amenities -Assumed risk that comunity would disagree
with funding priorities as established by
I__________ I_____________________ I_______________I_____ the buckets.
Source: Benson & Flaster, A Risk Management
Strategy for.i no.YBG
MIT/CRED Thesis, 1991
DEVELOPMENT RIGNTS - LAND PURCHASE AND PUBLIC FACILITY OPERATION AND
Operating Risks CONSTRUCTION PEASING STRATEGY PUBLIC AMENITY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING - MAINTENANCE FUNDING - BUCKET STRATEGY
BUCKET STRATEGY
Property Markets -Mitigated risk by flexibility of sale and -Assumed risk that O&Y will want to delay *Assumed risk by tieing flow of funds into
construction dates for private sites to the payments for the land in order to time public amenity operating account to the
minimize the risk of opening the private the entry of new construction to the property performance.
improvements when the property market is in market.
a recession.
-Mitigated the risk of not receiving the
-Protected the SFRA property values proceeds by establishing deadlines for land
purchase
Operating -Assumed risk that project will not be N/A 
-Assumed risk of the funding available for
Variability of successful until all phases are complete the SFRA to maintain and operate the public
Cash Flows and facilities over time
Project Vacancy -Mitigated risk by establishing each phase
with a workable synergy to attract people.
Financial Risks
Terms of Debt and -Mitigated risk by breaking the project -Mitigated financial risk for construction -Mitigated risk of having to funding public
Fees into phases, eliminating the need to for of public amenities by selling land to amenities by diversity of lease revenue and
developer to finance the entire project at developer and by requiring developer to participations
once finance land purchase on its own
-Assumed risk that the cultural facilities
would become self sufficient over time
Restrictive -Mitigated risk by restricting -Mitigated risk by restricting -Mitigated risk by requiring consent of
Covenants assignability or transfer of development assignability or transfer of development SFRA for assignment of leases and operating
rights by developer until after completion rights by developer until after completion contracts after private improvements are
of private improvement construction of private improvement construction completed
Partner Risks
Operating Risks -Mitigated risk by phasing developer -Assumed risk that O&Y would be unable to -Mitigated risk by substantially generating
funding commitments over time meet its commitments because of its funds from properties
portfolio of other properties
-Assumed risk that OLY would try to get out 
-Mitigated risk by having O&Y responsible
of its obligation to build retail on CB-2 for contributing only 20% directly to the
because it doesn't have retail expertise GSOM
Default -Mitigated risk by tieing development Mitigated risk by requiring minimum Assumed risk if public amenities were
rights on prize parcels to the SFRA's capitalization guarantees by the O&Y parent constructed before private improvements
timely receipt of land sale proceeds and company since operating fund is dependent on
construction of private improvements private property revenues.
integrating with public amenities *Mitigated risk by minimum developer equity
requirements (20%)
-Shifted risk through up-front cash spent
by OLY for option payments, negotiations -Mitigated risk by selecting partner that
and design of the entire project (over $25 places value on its reputation
capitalizationmillion to dateb
EXHIBIT 4.2
CHANGES IN PUBLIC RISK EXPOSURE SINCE 1984
RISKS
ASSUMED/MITIGATED/ DEVELOPMENT RIONTS - LAND PURCBACO AND PUBLIC FACILITY OPERATION AND
SBIFTED/ELIMINATED CONSTRUCTION PSASING STRATEGY PUBLIC AMENITY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING - MAINTENANCE FUNDING BUCKET STRATEGY
BY SFRA STRATEGY , BUCKET STRATEGY
sternal Market -Reduced risk by establishing prices on EB- -Increased risk by willingness and -No changes
iska 2 office parcels necessity of assuming financing risk
Interest Rates
Inflation -Increased risk of unanticipated -Increased risk by practically eliminating
Capital Market externalities making market conditions minimum developer equity requirements
Liquidity worse - Tax Reform Act of 1986, 1990 credit
(Availability) crunch -Reduced risk by converting use on EB-2c
Tax Policy from housing to office use and increasing
Regional Economy economic value
Project Risks
Development Risk
Construction -No Change -Increased risk by taking on construction No Change
Cost responsibility for CB-3 public amenities
Construction -Increased risk that project will not be -Reduced risk of receiving CB-1 proceeds on Increased risk due to delay in completion
Timing completed in synergistic phases by changing time for economic needs by securing of private improvements, although Marriott
phasing options developer obligation to pay cash currently provides sufficient operating
funds
-Reduced risk of additional delay in -increased risk of receiving EB-2 proceeds
construction of private improvements by in time to pay for public amenity
proceeding with construction of public construction. Results in need to create
amenities (when public amenities are bridge financing and take on financing
complete, developer should have more risks
incentive to build the private uses
Political -Reduced risk by getting mayor's support -Reduced risk by getting mayor's support No change
with receipt of cash payments for CB-1 with receipt of cash payments for CB-1
-Increased risk by delaying decision point -Increased risk by delaying decision point
for developer purchase of EB-2 until right for developer purchase of EB-2 until right
before mayoral election before mayoral election
Source: Benson & Flaster, A Risk Management
Strategy for... YBG
MIT/CRED Thesis, 1991
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS - LAND PURCHASE AND PUBLIC FACILITY OPERATION AND
Operating Risks CONSTRUCTION PHASING STRATEGY PUBLIC AMENITY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING - MAINTENANCE FUNDING - BUCKET STRATEGY
BUCKET STRATEGY
Property Markets -Increased risk by establishing new private 'Reduced risk by fixing floor prices for -Increased risk short term risk that uses
improvement construction dates and taking a EB-2 parcels will be successful due to phasing changes
stronger stand on the deadlines and completion'of the public amenities
-Reduce risk by constructing public before private improvements
amenities in advance since this will create
a higher value for the private sites -Reduced risk due to attraction of expanded
Moscone Convention Center
Operating -Increased risk by adjusting phases so that -No Change -Increased risk through change in cultural
Variability of CB-2 retail may not be completed with the facility from renter to presenter
Cash Flows and CB-2 public amenities
Project Vacancy -Reduced risk due to attraction of expanded
Moscone Convention Center
financial Risks
Terms of Debt and -No change -increased risk by constructing public -Increased risk that it may have to fund
Fees amenities in advance of private cultural facilities due to change from
improvements - creates need for bridge renter to presenter
financing
-Increased risk through willingness to
finance developer's land purchase and
willingness to assume credit risk
Restrictive *No change Increased risk by willingness to reduce -No Change
Covenants developer equity requirements
Partner Risks
Operating Risks No change -No change -No change
Default -No change Increased risk through willingness to .No change
finance almost 1004 of the purchase of CB-1
in order to get premium on the price
CHAPTER FIVE
DOES THE YBG STRATEGY SINK OR SWIM?
The saga of YBG and the public-private partnership
formed to facilitate the public objectives, will continue far
beyond the scope and the time constraints of this thesis.
Still, much can be learned from this complicated and
sometimes adversarial partnership.
A Decade Later: Strategy Intact
It can be argued that each party has already passed a
point of no return, and that if they were presented the
current deal anew with nothing yet at stake, each party would
turn it down citing that the returns simply did not justify
the risks. Through the negotiation process, the parties
established a momentum and mutual commitment to continue to
work together until they, or market and economic forces
beyond their control, presented a solution or termination to
their objectives. Their respective interests have been
interwoven to a point, and so much effort, time and money
have been invested, that each party has been willing to work
through the short-term obstacles in order to achieve their
long-term objectives.
This relationship, however, could not have been held
together throughout this turbulent process without a
successful strategy or framework, one that created mutually
binding interests. The phasing/bucket strategy has continued
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to keep each party's interests in lock-step with those of the
other. It has also served as a framework to adjust and fine-
tune the specifics of the agreement as various conditions
changed, all the while protecting the initial public
objectives sought through commercial development. The SFRA's
primary objective in seeking a private partner was that the
private development would fund the public amenities. Even
though the construction of the private and public
improvements are no longer in sync due to market conditions,
the funding source -- from the private side to the public
side -- is still very much intact, if not stretched by the
likelihood of public financing.
The questions of whether the SFRA has used the
phasing/bucket strategy to effectively manage their risk, or
whether they have exposed the public to too much risk are
rather subjective. As embodied in the original deal, the
strategy was certainly an effective tool to control and share
risk. Guided by its initial construction and operating
objectives, the SFRA secured its interests against certain
private rights and obligations. When the SFRA abandoned the
original construction priority and commenced construction of
the public improvements in the face of a real estate
depression, these actions may have seemed reckless. Though
what must not be overlooked, is the fact that the structure
and mechanisms of the 1984 deal allowed the SFRA to offset
this risk, in part, with what it achieved through O&Y's
commitment to an escalated price for the CB-1 office parcel.
119
This, remember, comes through at a time when most commercial
real estate has fallen in value and buyers are few and far
between.
This strategy, as any business strategy, falls short of
telling its user what its priorities should be, or how much
risk is too much. The SFRA has knowingly taken on risk to
develop these public benefits for the current citizens and
future generations of San Francisco. If the SFRA encounters
significant construction cost over-runs or operating
difficulties, ultimately its financial cushion will be the
taxpayers of San Francisco. The question, is how much has
been gained by the public-private strategy as opposed to an
outright public development of the Gardens, independent of
private investment and commercial activity in this area?
In developing a risk-management strategy for a public
agency in partnership with a private developer, each side
must possess skills or resources that the other party
desires. Since these commodities have different values to
each party, value can be created by reallocating them among
the partnership. To discover exactly what these commodities
and values should be, in light of the often conflicting
public and private objectives, a framework is needed to tie
these interests together so that the partnership can work
together towards a common goal. This can be illustrated by
the current negotiations: The SFRA wants a "bump" on the
sale of the CB-1 office parcel, while O&Y desires the right
to purchase and develop the EB-2 office parcels. By linking
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these two very different objectives, the public and private
sides are now focusing their efforts to resolve a difficult
financial dilemma.
The phasing/buckets strategy has provided an effective
framework, one able to control the specific timing of rights
and obligations as well as the flow of funds for these rights
with respect to construction and operation. This has allowed
each party to protect their interests while it has defined
the risk-sharing agreement. Though the planning for the YBG
project has been racked by unstable political, physical, and
economic factors, the structure of the agreement has remained
very much intact. Perhaps the parties have made an attempt
to preserve the structure because it has been the one stable
element throughout the process, the bulwark of an otherwise
turbulent environment without which there would have been
much more flailing and groping maneuvers to stay afloat.
Questions of Accountability
It is obviously difficult to negotiate and deal in any
partnership when the basis for existence of the partner
entities and the motives for entering into the partnership
are often at odds. Is the public risk being taken on for
public benefits or private benefits? Is it appropriate for a
public agency to take on the same level of entrepreneurial
risk as a private entity that does not have either a
fiduciary responsibility to act in the best interest of the
public or a high level of political accountability? How does
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a public developer formulate an effective strategy for
managing risk with a private partner whose purpose,
responsibilities, and motivations are in many ways foreign to
the public officials?
In a private entity, even one that is publicly held,
owners knowingly make a financial commitment to support the
decisions of the management. They can choose to stay as
owners or, if they disagree with decisions, they can choose
to sell their position. While companies do have a fiduciary
responsibility to their owners, they don't have the same
mandate for political accountability, nor do their decisions
effect the basic needs and daily existence of the owners.
Choosing a place to reside and being subject to the financial
commitments of the local government should not subject a
citizen to the same level of business risk as buying a share
of stock.
The public agency has a clear responsibility to provide
public benefits. In doing so, there are business risks that
are necessarily taken in order to achieve the public goals.
In the case of YBG, however, the SFRA has assumed risks not
typically associated with the traditional construction of
public improvements. The Agency is betting on the strength
of the private development and operations to help it realize
a more ambitious project than it would otherwise be able to
achieve through traditional methods of public finance. As
one observer put it, the SFRA is trying to build a Cadillac,
when a Honda would suffice.'20
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When the public developer takes on risks that are
-clearly tied to the private risks and benefits, the line
between public and private becomes blurred. Therein lies the
conflict, and the difficulty of both finding a public risk-
management strategy and making it work throughout the long
and constantly challenging life of a real estate project
developed by a public-private partnership.
The Return on Public Investment
Central to the conflict is the measurement of return. A
private development company measures its return on investment
primarily in monetary terms, although it clearly has some
interest in providing public benefits if only to promote the
self-interested financial success of its investment. The
public agency is less concerned with financial measurements
of return than with the publicly expressed satisfactions of
citizens and political constituencies, notwithstanding the
fact that it has some interest in financial returns because
they help secure the citizens' satisfaction with the outcome
of public risk-taking. The difference between these
priorities can make common goals very tough to perceive, and
it can intensify the potential for mistrust between the
public and private parties.
Do the benefits of public-private development justify
the business risks that a public agency might impose on the
city residents? In our society, this really depends upon
whether the citizenry consents. If so, then the answer must
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be yes, especially in these times of fiscal constraints. But
it must be reasoned and calculated risk-taking, supported by
agency accountability, both political and financial. Public
agencies entering into these kinds of complex obligations
need to be actively responsible for strategically managing
the risks undertaken and capable of understanding the
ramifications of assuming the special risks of real estate
development. Crafting and using a concept like the phasing
and buckets strategy provides a guide for internal and
external evaluation of the deal, in light of the agency's
goals and risk tolerances.
As part of this assessment framework, the agency becomes
constantly accountable to the public in a variety of ways.
In the case of the YBG development, the public has actively
participated in the decision-making processes, even prior to
the SFRA's partnership with O&Y. Through the community
participation, the public has had an opportunity to choose
its benefits. Through the support of the.YBG Cultural Center
and the SFMOMA, it has chosen the symbol of arts and culture
as its return for the public risk-taking.
The phasing/bucket strategy provides an understandable
framework that the SFRA can use to publicly communicate the
complicated deal. Certainly the public is aware of the
framework and conceives of the risks within the structure.
This is evidenced in at least one instance by the citizen
discussion of the funding priorities for operation and
maintenance of the public amenities. It is also evidenced in
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a broader sense by the citizen participation in the SFRA
Commission's decision not to accept what it considered
unreasonable financial risks in the recent CB-1 financing
proposals.
The public benefits chosen through this process are very
difficult to measure in a traditional manner of cost-benefit
analysis because they are qualitative benefits, and not
necessarily quantitative in every sense. How do you measure
the benefits of health care, police protection, or even a
park, playground, or museum? Certainly, these policy goals
can be measured only subjectively since they benefit the
public as a whole. When a public developer, however, takes
on private financial risk to achieve these policy benefits,
perhaps the return should be measured by both the project-
specific public benefits, on the basis of qualitative
criteria, as well as by the additional financial return
available to fund other public benefits. After all, the
private developer would expect a higher return for higher
risk, so why shouldn't the public developer?
What lessons has the SFRA learned?
In contemplating developing another project as complex
as YBG, one lesson the SFRA has learned was expressed by
Robert Gamble, the SFRA's Deputy Executive Director of
Finance:
We might not put all our eggs in one basket with a
single large developer. There's a fundamental
problem with a single developer in a project like
125
YBG... .The DDA becomes a giant monolithic document
that no one understands. The Agency is subject to
negotiating with a hardball developer. Competition
would be good.121
Arguably though, while the competition of a multi-developer
deal would have a positive impact on the bargaining power of
the SFRA, the deal might have similar problems with the
complexity of the documents and may even be more difficult to
administer and coordinate.
Another important lesson is that the public sector
cannot ignore market fundamentals. While office use has
typically been the economically viable use that subsidized
other less profitable uses such as housing, it too is subject
to external economic risk. When a mixed-use project becomes
dependent on office use as the economic justification of the
deal, it is in serious danger of losing its mixed-use
identity and becoming an oversized office park. This would
in many ways defeat the public policy objectives.
With the luxury of hindsight into the extreme economic
difficulties faced by the office market today, a third very
important lesson is that the public developer cannot rely on
the office component to drive the deal according to schedule.
In fact, it came dangerously close to stalling the YBG deal.
The original agreement was structured in a relatively strong
office market that has grown progressively worse since 1984.
This is not to suggest that other uses would have faired
better or that the deal was not financially justified.
Rather, it leads to the realization that the SFRA was
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actively participating in real estate development and making
calculated decisions with respect to product and risk.
The Agency and YBG, along with the private sector, have
suffered some unexpected setbacks in recent years. Still,
the Agency' s original strategy, along with some unique and
sophisticated public financing solutions, has managed to keep
the project from sinking. While it is true that the office
development is still driving the deal financially, the public
amenities are now steering the way.
Conclusion
If economic conditions had not changed so dramatically
after the DDA was signed, the YBG project would have probably
proceeded with much less deviation from the schedule and
funding requirements. Public agencies that develop projects
dependent on private development must try to create stable
strategies to anticipate such inevitable changes. That is
the bottom line of public management for this type of risk-
taking: It forces the public developer to prudently evaluate
the public benefits in terms of the agency's financial risk
tolerance and allows it to be politically accountable.
The phasing/buckets strategy implemented by the SFRA in
developing YBG did help protect it from anticipated risks,
but the SFRA's own purposeful deviation from the strategy has
led it into uncharted waters. While the benefits of Yerba
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Buena Gardens to the City of San Francisco will soon be
realized, the ultimate costs and returns are still unknown.
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS
ARE
CB
CSOM
DDA
EB
GMCC
GMCCX
GSOM
MIT CRED
O&Y
RFQ
SFMOMA
SFRA
YBC
YBG
YBGA
YBGCC
Arts, Recreation, & Entertainment
Central Block
Cultural Security, Operation, & Maintenance
Disposition and Development Agreement
East Block
George R. Moscone Convention Center
George R. Moscone Convention Center Expansion
Garden Security, Operation, & Maintenance
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for
Real Estate Development
Olympia & York
Request For Qualifications
San Francisco Museum of Modern Art
San Francisco Redevelopment Agency
Yerba Buena Center
Yerba Buena Gardens
Yerba Buena Gardens Associates (Olympig & York and
The Marriott Corporation)
Yerba Buena Gardens Cultural Center
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HISTORY OF YBG - 1953 TO 1980
Yerba Buena Center is located in an area that was
designated in 1953 as Redevelopment Area "D" (See Exhibit
0.3), a possible redevelopment project under the federal
urban renewal program for the purpose of removing residential
uses from the area of mixed industrial and commercial uses
because of substandard and blighted living conditions. 122 At
that time, the neighborhood contained a mix of factories,
warehouses, machine shops, laundries, boiler works, and
residential hotels and boarding houses sheltering working
class residents. The area was described by planners,
newspapers and city officials as "skid row", inhabited by
bums, drifters and transients. 123
The original planners of YBC presented their project as
a two-fold public service: economic revival through
construction jobs and increased tourist and convention
business, and assistance to the city in clearing out an
"undesirable element". 1 2 4 In response to lobbying by the
business community, the initial redevelopment proposal was
for a large-scale development with office buildings, hotel,
retail shops, a baseball and football stadium, a convention
center with exhibition halls to meet city tourist and visitor
needs, and parking for 7,000 cars. This plan would have
resulted in total clearance of the 23 blocks, but was opposed
by the City Planning Director who found little evidence of
blight as required under' the federal urban renewal program.125
In 1961, after redefining the boundaries of Area "D",
the SFRA applied for a federal urban renewal survey and
planning grant which was accepted (in the amount of $600,000)
in October 1962. While no specific plan had been developed,
the application outlined the SFRA's proposed treatment of the
SOMA area:
-Total removal of the residential buildings;
*Removal of the business structures blighted beyond
conversion or conservation;
-Renovation of salvageable commercial and industrial
buildings by existing owners;
eCreation of public areas which contribute to a
wholesome working environment, with provision for
needed public facilities;
-Replotting of parcels to allow better use of land and
encourage new investment;
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eDevelopment of all vacant or open land by existing
owners. 126
Despite the anticipated comprehensive rehabilitation of
the YBC area and wholesale harsh removal of residents, the
SFRA application included public amenities and a sports
arena. This idea carried through to the 1963 General Plan
Proposals published by the Department of City Planning 127 and
to it was added a park and convention center convention
center. In early 1964, the SFRA completed a preliminary
conceptual and design plan for YBC that provided for open
pedestrian space in the central blocks between Third and
Fourth Streets, leading to a convention and exhibit hall
between Howard and Folsom Streets, and hotels, offices, and
retail spaces on either side. 128 It is worth noting that this
plan is not significantly different than the 1991 site plan.
In 1966, the SFRA entered into a loan-and-capital-grant
contract with the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) through which $19.6-million of federal funds were made
available for property acquisition, relocation, demolition,
and site preparation.129 In 1967, designers were retained to
produce a plan for a 350,000-square-foot exhibition hall, a
14,000-seat sports arena, an 800-room hotel, a 2,200-seat
theater, 4,000 parking spaces, office buildings, retail
shops, and pedestrian malls and plazas. This plan was
approved by the SFRA as meeting its criteria in integrating
large-scale public uses with economically productive private
development, emphasizing pedestrian movement and
environment 130
The Legal Battles Begin
In preparation for implementing the YBC plan, the SFRA
began displacing residents and demolishing buildings. 131 In
response, the first of numerous legal battles by citizen
action groups began in 1968. Acting on resident complaints
of poor quality relocation offerings and maltreatment by SFRA
relocation workers, attorneys from the San Francisco
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation (SFNLAF) petitioned
HUD for an administrative hearing on the YBC relocation
plan. 132
After HUD denied the SFNLAF petitions, the YBC residents
formed the Tenants and Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment
(TOOR) and filed a complaint in federal court against both
HUD and the SFRA, arguing that the SFRA had not located safe,
decent and sanitary housing for displacees according to
rights contained in the 1949 Housing Act. The suit was
settled by the SFRA agreeing to provide 1,500 units of low-
cost housing.
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When TOOR discovered that the SFRA planned to fulfill
its obligation by counting public housing already scheduled
to be built, and that this would be taking the low-cost
housing away from other needy residents, TOOR again filed
suit for injunctive relief in 1970. Two weeks later, Judge
Stanley A. Weigel granted the injunction, and halted all
demolition and relocation until the YBC relocation plan was
revised. 133
When settlement discussions failed, Judge Weigel drafted
a consent decree that required the SFRA to guarantee
production within 3 years (by November 1973) of 1, 500 to
1,800 units of new low-rent housing anywhere in the city and
to house relocatees in decent, safe, and sanitary housing
within their means. The decree also required that four
residential hotels within the project area, but outside the
Central Blocks, be refurbished at SFRA cost until the
replacement units were constructed. This agreement allowed
the SFRA to continue relocation and demolition in the YBC
project area134.
Problems with the First Financing Plan
Meanwhile, the SFRA was actively soliciting development
proposals for the Central Blocks. In 1970, the development
team of Schlessinger-Arcon/Pacific was selected to develop
both the public and private facilities on the Central
Blocks. 135  By mid 1971, partly in response to the Agency's
sluggish attitude toward the statutorily and judicially
imposed obligations for replacement housing and partly in
response to intense pressure to break ground for the
convention center complex, the City's Chief Administrative
Officer, Thomas Mellon, began to question the SFRA's handling
of the YBC project.13 6
The financing plan devised by then Director of the SFRA,
Justin Herman, and Albert Schlessinger of the development
team was a result of both political and economic
considerations. The goal was to put together a scheme,
though not necessarily the least costly, which would provide
the most rapid, flexible, and politically acceptable method
of raising funds and exercising control over their use for
construction of the public facilities. The plan called for
tax-exempt bonds backed by the city's hotel tax, to be issued
by non-profit corporations established by Schlessinger and
his partners. Schlessinger-Arcon/Pacific would then receive
substantial developer's fees (over $5-million) for building
the public facilities and would negotiate a fee with a
general contractor, rather than submit the project to
competitive bid. 137
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Mellon announced the existence of possible illegalities
and conflicts of interest in the public facilities financing
plan proposed by the SFRA [probably due to the participation
of Schlessinger in both the development entity and the non-
profit corporation, leading to a question of the 'public
purpose' of the bond financing], plus serious design defects
for the YBC exhibition hall. This led to the City's decision
to develop the convention center facilities directly,13 8
although the basic design for an underground facility was
retained to prevent additional delays. 139
Mellon was critical of the plan partly as a result of
his recent experience with construction cost over-runs on
Candlestick Park, 140 and partly because of a private political
power struggle between himself and Herman. He suggested that
construction responsibility for the YBC public and private
facilities be split, with the public facilities built by the
City and funded through a City offering of a general
obligation bond issue to be submitted to the voters. 141 While
the mayor, Joseph Alioto, was primarily concerned with
getting the YBC facilities built, he also recognized that a
vote on the general obligation bonds would be unlikely to
succeed.
When the dust cleared, the City had responsibility for
construction of the public facilities, Schlessinger/Arcon-
Pacific was reimbursed for its expenses in what has been
described as a probable "buy-off", and Mellon had the task of
devising a new financing plan. Shortly after this internal
political squabble, Herman died, reducing further the role of
the SFRA in the YBC development project.142
Between 1971 and 1978, YBC suffered further financing
difficulties, legal setbacks, and significant design changes.
Until 1972, the project was able to proceed using federal
grants and loans, totalling over $40-million by that time.
The 1972 financing plan proposed a $219-million capital
expenditure (hard construction costs were estimated to be
$142-million) to be funded by a $225-million SFRA bond issue.
Under this arrangement, the public facilities would be leased
by the Agency to the City for an estimated $14.5-million
annually, enough to amortize the bonds and to cover any
additional expenses that might be incurred by the SFRA. The
lease term was 35 years, at which time title to the
facilities would be transferred to the City. The rent would
be payable whether or not the facility revenues covered the
debt. 143
The bonds were projected to be sold at a 6% interest
rate, although a memo from the City's Budget Analyst
suggested that a 7 to 7 1/2% rate would be more likely. The
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plan's revenue projections were itemized from the following
sources:
eLand rents from leases with a private developer for
sites in the Central Blocks;
*Income from the public facilities;
eHotel tax allocation (36% of the then 5.5% city wide
hotel tax);
eProperty tax increment over the amount of property
taxes received in 1965.144
The plan was approved unanimously by the City's Board of
Supervisors after perfunctory hearings at which the
Supervisors did not question the validity of the inherent
cost and revenue assumptions. 14 5  Immediately after the
approval, two taxpayers' law suits were filed in state court,
challenging the financing plan as an unconstitutional attempt
to encumber San Francisco residents with massive long-term
debt obligations without seeking voter approval. They
claimed that since the City was obligated to make the "rent"
payments to the SFRA even if revenues were not sufficient to
cover the debt, then the bonds were actually general
obligation bonds requiring voter approval.
Settlements and Renegotiations
At about the same time, six conservation groups filed
suit in federal court, claiming that YBC violated the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). As a
result of plaintiffs' agreement not to appeal the adverse
decisions, HUD agreed to produce an Environmental Impact
Statement. Appeal of the suits would have delayed the YBC
project indefinitely. Also, at about the same time in 1972,
the TOOR settlement was being renegotiated since the SFRA had
been sluggish in fulfilling its affordable housing
obligations . 14 6  (Although later than anyone would have
anticipated, the SFRA finally did provide low-rent units in
excess of the number required under the settlement
agreement.)
In 1974, after two years of the City not answering the
legal complaints in the financing suits, a tentative
settlement was reached. Because the taxpayers were concerned
the revenues available to fund the annual bond payments, the
agreement reduced the maximum bond issue from $225 to $210-
million to finance all of the public amenities, including the
convention center. It also required deletion of the sports
arena from the public facilities portion of the bond issue.'47
In 1975, the City received a low construction bid of $162.8-
million for the remaining facilities, but continual
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litigation, escalating construction costs, and deletion of
the sports arena from the program caused the contractor to
withdraw the bid. 14 8 (See Exhibit 1.1) .
In 1976, Mayor George R. Moscone appointed a committee
of sixteen interested citizens, including both proponents and
opponents of a convention center, to submit a recommendation
for the development of YBC. Following public meetings,
review, and comments, the committee recommended an
alternative plan that retained the convention center and
provided for 3-million square feet of office space, 300,000
square feet of retail uses, 602 units of elderly housing, 300
units of subsidized-family housing, 650 units of market-rate
housing, a commercial recreation/entertainment park (Tivoli
style), and 350,000 square feet of light industrial uses for
the 11 acres of the three Central Blocks.149
The underground convention center was to be constructed
with a 4% hotel tax (instead of the property tax increment
fund) that would collateralize the lease revenue bonds issued
by the SFRA. The general terms of the financing plan were
approved by the voters in November 1976. In 1977, the Board
of Supervisors approved the recommendation of the Mayor's
committee and permitted the City to retain a construction
manager and an architect. Shortly thereafter, the voters
approved all the necessary long-term City leases needed to
support the convention center revenue bonds.150
In 1978, the SFRA filed a validation suit15 on the
specific details of the new YBC financing plan. As a result,
interested parties challenged the financing plan, again for
the reason that the plan violated the voters' right to
approve the details of the long-term financing commitment by
the City. The financing plan was upheld by the courts, and
within days of the the last legal decision, with all legal
barriers being removed, the SFRA sold its $97-million YBC
bond issue to finance the convention center. Post-excavation
work began in 1979, and the 300,000-square-foot Moscone
Convention Center (so named because of the tragic murder of
Mayor Moscone in November 1978) opened in 1981.152
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APPENDIX C:
-April 1980-
eNovember 1980-
*December 1980-
'April 1984-
*December 19, 1984-
*February 12, 1986-
-July 7, 1986-
-August 26, 1986-
eNovember 2, 1986-
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS SINCE 1980
The SFRA issued a Request for
Qualifications (RFQ) to local, national,
and international developers.
The SFRA selected the team of Olympia &
York/Marriott Corporation/Beverly Willis
Associates for exclusive negotiating
rights to the YBC Central Blocks.
The SFRA and O&Y/Marriott/Willis began to
negotiate the terms of the Disposition
and Development Agreement (DDA).
The SFRA and O&Y/Marriott/Willis
announced an agreement as to basic terms
of the DDA.
The Mayor signed the Disposition and
Development Agreement with construction
to start in 1988. Cost of public
improvements estimated at $52.5-million
with construction to start in 1988.
A meeting was called in Mayor Dianne
Feinstein's office to alert the SFRA and
the Developer of the possible expansion
of George R. Moscone Convention Center
(GMCCX) and initiate studies to evaluate
the proposed expansion.
A plan prepared by architects Mitchell-
Giurgola, James Stewart Polshek, and
Fumihiko Maki was adopted by the SFRA
Commission. This plan demonstrated how
the GMCCX could be accommodated
underneath the Cultural buildings, the
gardens, and a second Convention Center
Lobby on CB-2. This plan would displace
YBGA's planned 1,250 parking spaces.
Construction began on Phase 1, the 1,500-
room Marriott Hotel on CB-1.
The voters approved Proposition B, which
calls for the expansion of the Moscone
Convention Center underground Central
Block 2, conditioned on the Agency's
determination that the gardens could be
developed.
136
*November 1986-
eAugust 19, 1986-
eMarch 17, 1987-
-November 24, 1987-
*March 1, 1988-
*March 8, 1988-
*June 13, 1989-
-July 2, 1990-
The SFRA began negotiations with YBGA to
delete the parking parcel from the DDA to
permit the Convention Center Expansion.
The SFRA and YBGA agreed on a Fourth
Amendment which 1) makes additional
modifications to the schedule of
performance in the DDA, 2) adds
provisions relating to the proposed
Convention Center Expansion Program, and
3) provides certain rights and easements
in connection with the Marriott Hotel.
The SFRA and YBGA agreed on a Fifth
Amendment which sets forth the terms and
conditions for the Developer to proceed
with construction of the improvements of
the CB-2 Hotel parcel (underground) in
accordance with a revised plan and
easements which accommodate the GMCCX
through CB-2. It also provided for
extension for the Gardens start from 1988
to late 1990 or early 1991.
The SFRA and YBGA agreed on a Sixth
Amendment which 1) provided for the
removal of the CB-2 parking parcel from
the DDA and the quitclaiming of the
Developer's interest therein to the SFRA,
2) elimination of the option to purchase
and its replacement by Developer's
commitment to purchase the CB-1 office
site on or before July 1, 1990, and 3)
construction of the CB-1 office building
to commence on or before July 1, 1995.
The SFRA approved the schematic plans for
the GMCC expansion estimated at $102-
million.
The preliminary cost estimates for
gardens with the features necessary to
mitigate impact of the GMCCX and to allow
for inflation due to delays reviewed at
SFRA meeting. Gardens cost refined and
estimate of $95-million presented.
O&Y proposed plan to complete central
blocks of YBG by 1992.
O&Y announced plans to construct three
office buildings as a part of the $1-
billion YBG development and handed over a
$4.4-million check to SFRA as "good
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*June 19, 1990-
*February 7, 1991-
-May 2, 1991-
-June 1991-
faith" payment, cementing an innovative
financing agreement which allows the
project to go forward and relieves city
of having to utilize $24-million in tax
increment funding.
Reached a memorandum of understanding
hours before a deadline for O&Y to commit
to the project or lose its role in the
project. This tentatively defined terms
including the sale of the CB-1 office
parcel to O&Y by July 2, 1990.
Meyer Frucher, of O&Y, made the first
installment payment,$3.6-million of $39.
This new arrangement (Eighth Amendment)
was necessary because a bond financing
that had been contemplated was no longer
feasible in the current economic climate.
The deposit approach was selected because
it provides the agency with advances of
necessary cash flow for its public
improvements, while preserving the
options of bond financing at a later date
to potentially increase the amount the
agency will have available for public
improvements.
Mayor Art Agnos accepted an $11.1-million
check that insures the construction of a
24-acre garden, cultural complex and
tribute to Martin Luther King.
Construction will begin by mid-summer on
CB-2. The SFRA awarded a steel contract
for the Performing Arts Center and the
Visual Arts Forum. Construction of the
centerpiece five-acre esplanade and
fountain is scheduled to begin in
October.
The SFRA and YBGA failed to reach
agreement and lost the opportunity to
finance the sale of the CB-1 office
parcel through a Mello-Roos Bond issue.
-September 30, 1991-Deadline for CB-1 financing plan giving
SFRA a premium on the CB-1 sale proceeds.
If deadline is met, O&Y preserves the
right to purchase EB-2 office sites. If
deadline is missed, O&Y must continue
cash payments, but loses the EB-2 office
development rights, preserving only the
right to develop EB-2c as residential.
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GLOSSARY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLIC BOND
FINANCE MECHANISMS
Tax Increment Bond
Tax-exempt bonds issued by a public agency for a public
purpose. The annual payments to bond holders are
secured by and paid from the incremental property taxes
over a selected base year on land in a designated
district.
Tax Allocation Bond
Tax-exempt bonds issued by a public agency for a public
purpose. The annual payments to bond holders are
secured by and paid from a designated portion of a city
tax. For example, if a city's hotel tax is 10%, the city
could designate 30% of the tax collected to pay off the
bonds.
Mello-Roos Bond
Tax-exempt bonds issued by a public agency for a public
purpose. The annual payments to bond holders are
secured by and paid from a Mello-Roos property tax
collected by the city on a designated district. The
annual bond liability becomes a tax lien on the
property.
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